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Abstract 
 
 
 
Financial engineering instruments such as guarantees, loans and equity are increasingly used in 
public funding of enterprises. These instruments have three attractive features: they are 
repayable, they “leverage” private involvement, and they have a multiplier effect because they 
generate new income. At the same time, however, they are technically complex and they are 
subject to state aid rules. Their assessment under EU state aid rules creates two additional 
problems. First, under certain conditions financial instruments may not contain state aid. This is 
when public authorities act as “private investors”. This means that state aid cannot be presumed 
to exist in all financial instruments. It must first be established through market analysis. Second, 
when state aid is found to be present it is not always possible to quantify it. For this reason the 
state aid rules that apply to financial instruments differ significantly from other rules. This paper 
reviews how financial instruments have been assessed by the European Commission and under 
which conditions the state aid they may contain can be considered to be compatible with the 
internal market. The paper finds that by and large Member States have succeeded to design 
measures that have all been approved by the Commission. 
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Introduction  
The purpose of this paper is to review the assessment of financial engineering instruments 
under the state aid rules of the European Union. Financial engineering instruments are loans, 
guarantees, equity or other forms of funding where risk is shared between investors and the 
enterprises in which they invest. Although such financial instruments are complex, they are 
gaining prominence in public policy towards enterprises, particularly small and medium-sized 
enterprises [SMEs], mainly for two reasons. 
 
First, they “leverage” limited public support by incentivising the involvement of the private 
sector. If, for example, every euro provided by the state is matched by a euro from private 
sources, the total amount that benefits SMEs is doubled. In times of budgetary austerity this 
leveraging effect is very important to cash-strapped public authorities. 
 
Second, these financial instruments have a “multiplier effect”. Once capital or loans are repaid, 
they can be used again to support new SMEs. Moreover, they can generate additional income 
from payments of dividends on equity, interest on loans and premia on guarantees. 
 
Unlike grants which are used in one-off operations to support single companies, financial 
instruments can be re-used and can increase the total amount of available funding so many 
more companies can be assisted. These advantageous far outweigh the problems associated 
with their complexity. During the period 2007-13, EU structural funds have allocated EUR 10.5 
billion to operational programmes covering financial instruments. 
 
However, the complexity of financial instruments makes it difficult to assess their compatibility 
with EU state aid rules. There are two main problems here. First, it is not always evident 
whether state aid is involved at all. According to Article 345 TFEU, the state may invest in 
companies or, more broadly, “undertakings” which comprise any entity that engages in 
economic activities. It cannot be presumed that every time the state makes a capital injection 
or grants a loan it confers an advantage, in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, to the recipient 
undertaking. 
 
Article 107(1) prohibits in principle the granting of state aid. But a public measure constitutes 
state aid only if it provides an advantage that is not available under normal market conditions. 
To determine whether public investments deviate from normal market conditions, it becomes 
necessary to compare the terms of investment by the state with the terms that would be 
acceptable to a private investor under similar circumstances. This is a complex operation which 
requires extensive market analysis. 
 
Second, even if an advantage can be detected, it is not easy to calculate its magnitude or its 
grant-equivalent amount. Since state aid is in principle incompatible with the internal market, 
any public measure that contains state aid must fall into one of the categories of exemption 
allowed by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. But aid that is in the end 
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exempted from the overall prohibition must satisfy the criteria of necessity and 
proportionality. It must be capable of achieving an objective of public policy and must not go 
beyond the minimum necessary. This means that the amount of aid must be calculated. With 
financial instruments this is not easy or always possible. The amount of aid is the size of the 
advantage conferred. But the size of the advantage depends on many factors such as, for 
example, the credit worthiness of the recipient undertaking, the quality of the collateral it can 
offer, the risk assumed by the public investors, etc. 
 
For these two reasons, the European Commission has developed special rules for assessing the 
compatibility of aid in financial instruments. It is important to understand the intricacies of 
these rules and the difficulties in their application because the intention of the Commission is 
to give more prominence to financial engineering instruments in the application of structural 
funds for the period 2014-20.1 
 
This paper reviews the relevant rules and analyses seminal cases from the decisional practice 
of the Commission and the jurisprudence of EU Courts in order to shed light on a relative 
obscure area of state aid policy. The paper is divided into two parts. Part I examines the rules 
and practice on injections of risk capital. Part II examines the corresponding rules and practice 
on public loans and guarantees. 
                                                 
1
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
covered by the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, COM(2011) 615 final/2, 14 March 2012. 
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PART I:  RISK CAPITAL 
 
The assessment of the compatibility of state aid in injections of risk capital is different from the 
typical state aid practice because there are no eligible costs. Apart from a ceiling for the 
maximum amount of risk capital that can be invested per annum there are no rates of aid 
intensity either. Unlike other areas of state aid where the subsidised projects have to fall 
within well-defined categories, in the risk capital area it is the act of investment that is 
assessed. 
 
In view of these differences and given the fact that “financial engineering instruments”, 
including risk capital, will be given more prominence in the actions that will be supported by 
EU structural funds in the period 2014-202, this paper seeks to shed light on an otherwise 
under-researched area of state aid policy. 
 
Since the coming into force of the current Risk Capital Guidelines on 1 January 2007,3 the 
European Commission has examined about 85 risk capital measures. Of these 85 or so 
measures, the Commission undertook a detailed assessment in about 20 cases. Only one 
measure has been found to be incompatible with the internal market. However, the finding of 
incompatibility was not because the measure infringed state aid rules but rather because it 
violated fundamental internal market principles, namely the principles of non-discrimination 
and free establishment.4 In about another 15 cases, the Commission concluded that no state 
aid was involved, despite the presence of public funds. This was because the public 
investments conformed with the private investor principle. Another 40 or so measures have 
been adopted by Member States on the basis of the general Block Exemption Regulation5 and 
therefore have not been subject to any prior assessment by the Commission. 
 
Available statistics reveal that Member State expenditure on risk capital has totalled about 
EUR 3.5 billion in the period 2006-11.6 The majority of risk capital measures have been 
implemented by just a handful of Member States: Germany, France and the United Kingdom. 
Germany in particular has been very active in inducing investments in newly established 
companies. Other Member States that have supported risk capital investments are Italy, Spain, 
the Netherlands, Ireland, Finland, Hungary and Greece. The new Member States as a whole do 
not seem to be active in risk capital investments. 
                                                 
2
 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down common 
provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, 
the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund 
covered by the Common Strategic Framework and laying down general provisions on the European 
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006, COM(2011) 615 final/2, 14 March 2012. 
3
 OJ C 194, 18.8.2006, p. 2–21, amended in 2010 OJ C 329, 7.12.2010, p. 4–5. 
4
 See Commission Decision 2010/13 on scheme C 2/2009 concerning capital investments in Germany. 
5
 Regulation 800/2008. 
6
 European Commission, DG Competition, Revision of the State Aid Rules for SME Access to Risk Finance, 
Issues Paper, 22 November 2012. 
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The paper examines in depth four measures that have been found, in the first place, to contain 
state aid, and, subsequently, to satisfy the criteria of the balancing test and therefore to be 
compatible with the internal market. These four measures are representative of the 
Commission’s approach to establishing the compatibility of state aid contained in risk capital 
investments that use public funds. 
 
In general, the Commission carries out detailed assessment of state aid in two instances: i) 
when the amount of aid exceeds certain thresholds and ii) when the measure in question is 
assessed directly on Article 107(3)(c). I hasten to add that detailed assessment should not be 
confused with the opening of the formal investigation procedure. The latter occurs when the 
Commission has doubts about the compatibility of a measure, largely because the Member 
State concerned fails to provide sufficient information. The purpose of the detailed assessment 
is to determine the necessity of aid, establish the extent of distortion of competition and 
balance the positive and negative effects of aid. Although there are no publicly available 
statistics, it seems that the vast majority of measures subject to detailed assessment are 
approved without any formal investigation. 
 
The reason for the detailed assessment of risk capital measures appears to be different from 
the reason for the detailed assessment in other state aid areas. The cases that are reviewed in 
this paper and the cases which are listed in Annex I.1 have been subject to detailed assessment 
not because Member States intended to grant aid that exceeded pre-defined thresholds but 
because they wanted to i) use more debt instruments (e.g. loans) than equity, ii) reduce the 
participation of private co-investors below 50% and iii) provide funding to firms outside 
assisted areas or beyond their start-up stage. Again, we see that the practice in the risk capital 
area differs from that in other state aid areas. It is not the amount of aid that is normally the 
critical issue, as is the case, for example, in R&D subsidies, but the nature of the instruments 
and specific targets of the risk capital measure. 
 
Part I of the paper is organised as follows. It starts by explaining who the beneficiaries of aid 
are and then providing a summary of the compatibility criteria as they are elaborated in the 
Risk Capital Guidelines [RCG]. There are two sets of criteria; those for the standard assessment 
and additional ones used in the detailed assessment where the balancing tests applies. It 
continues with a short review of the aims and approach of the balancing test. Then the paper 
analyses the four representative risk capital measures and explains the reasoning of the 
Commission. Part I of the paper concludes by identifying the main factors that appear decisive 
in influencing the Commission’s compatibility assessment and the practical application of the 
balancing test in risk capital cases. In addition, Annex I.1 lists cases that have been subject to 
detailed assessment. Annex I.2 lists cases where public funding of risk capital instruments has 
been found not to constitute state aid. 
 
The main finding of the paper is that in contrast to the practice of the Commission in other 
cases of state aid where it insists in quantitative comparisons of counterfactuals in order to 
determine the necessity and effects of state aid, in risk capital cases the Commission appears 
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to be satisfied with ex ante legal constraints imposed on fund managers and investors. In 
practice, empirical analysis is largely confined to surveys of investor behaviour. Such surveys 
contain a lot of qualitative information based on investor opinion and preferences instead of 
hard facts. This is rather surprising because the main purpose of the balancing test and the 
refined economic approach on which it is founded is to utilise more fact-based economic and 
quantitative analysis. The reason for this marked difference appears to be that risk capital is 
provided to enterprises without being linked to specific projects whose impact can be 
measured. 
 
I.1. Existence of state aid 
The purpose of public policy on risk capital is to incentivise investors to provide more funding 
than normal to SMEs. Therefore, there may be state aid at four different levels: investors, 
funds, fund managers, SMEs.  
 
Point 3.2 of the Risk Capital Guidelines explains that if there is aid at the level of the investors, 
then the Commission presumes that at least some aid is passed on to SMEs invested in. This is 
the case even when “investment decisions are being taken by the managers of the fund with a 
purely commercial logic.” 
 
It is a general principle of state aid law that aid can be granted directly or indirectly via benefits 
or inducements that are given to third parties. In case T-93/02, CNCM v Commission, 
paragraph 95, the General Court found that “the fact that a Member State renounces tax 
revenue may involve an indirect transfer of State resources, capable of being treated as aid to 
economic operators other than those to which the tax advantage is accorded directly.” This 
principle is not confined to tax measures. It applies to any other form of aid. The Commission 
has to consider aid that is granted both directly and indirectly. 
 
With respect to SMEs, the Commission has found in numerous cases that aid at the level of 
investors or funds is at least partly passed on to final beneficiaries. In case SA.34582 
concerning measures to encourage risk capital investments in newly-created enterprises in 
Italy, it was stated that “it is consistent Commission practice to consider that where aid is 
present at the level of the investors, the investment vehicle or the investment fund, it is at 
least partly passed on to the target SMEs and thus that it is also present at their level. This is 
the case even where investment  decisions are being taken by the managers of the fund with a 
purely commercial logic.” [paragraph 50] 
 
In this particular case the Commission concluded that “the measure therefore facilitates,  
through the … advantage provided to the private investors, the provision of risk capital to 
SMEs, which would otherwise not be available, or at least not to the same extent, in the 
absence of the measure. The measure therefore confers an advantage on the investee SMEs.” 
[paragraph 51] 
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A similar conclusion was reached in case SA.34006 concerning a venture capital fund in the 
Italian region of Basilicata. The Commission considered “that where aid is present at the level 
of the investors, it is at least partly passed on to the target enterprises and thus that it is also 
present at their level. This is the case even where investment decisions are being taken by the 
managers of the fund with a purely commercial logic. In the present scheme, Region Basilicata 
provides via the Fund State resources to a limited number of target enterprises that otherwise 
would not have found the same amount of finance.” [paragraphs 81-82] 
 
With respect to investment funds and investment managers, point 3.2 of the Guidelines 
explains that “in general, the Commission considers that an investment fund or an investment 
vehicle is an intermediary vehicle for the transfer of aid to investors and/or enterprises in 
which investment is made, rather than being a beneficiary of aid itself.” The same point 
clarifies that “there is a presumption of no aid if the managers or management company are 
chosen through an open and transparent public tender procedure or if they do not receive any 
other advantages granted by the State.” 
 
Overall, the Commission routinely concludes that there is no state aid for funds when they are 
established for the sole purpose of channeling resources to SMEs and have no other economic 
activity. The Commission also considers that fund managers receive no aid when they 
competitively selected or their remuneration is benchmarked at competitive rates. See, for 
example, cases NN 45/2009, Venture Capital Scheme, Land of Styria; N 406/2009, 
Clusterfonds, Bavaria; N 722/2009, Risk Capital Aid Scheme, Region Lazio]. 
 
By contrast, when risk capital measures favour particular funds or managers, the Commission 
is of the view that such funds or managers benefit from indirect aid even when the aid is 
granted to investors. In this instance, there is aid at all levels: funds, managers and final 
beneficiary SMEs. 
 
In its Decision 2006/638, paragraph 36, on an Italian measure concerning tax incentives for 
collective investments, the Commission stated the following: “even if specialised investment 
vehicles do not benefit directly from the tax reduction granted to their investors, they 
nonetheless receive an indirect economic benefit in so far as the tax reduction on investments 
in specialised vehicles prompts investors to buy shares [participate] in such vehicles, thereby 
providing additional liquidity and extra income in terms of entry and management fees”. 
 
It went on in paragraph 39 of the same Decision to add that “a tax advantage provided to 
investors investing in specialized investment vehicles favours the vehicles themselves as 
undertakings when they have a corporate form or the undertakings managing such vehicles 
when they have a contractual form. In particular, the increased demand for shares of 
specialized investment vehicles leads to an increase in the management and entry fees 
charged by the vehicles or by the undertakings managing them.” This Decision was confirmed 
by the General Court in its judgment in case T-424/05, Italy v Commission. 
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I.2. Criteria of compatibility of state aid for risk capital 
The RCG are applicable to aid schemes only7 falling under Article 107(1).8 The Guidelines have 
two main aims: to explain when state aid is present in risk capital measures and to define 
criteria for establishing the compatibility of such aid with the internal market. The RGC do not 
apply to ad-hoc or individual aid, export aid or to schemes not excluding firms in difficulty or 
firms in the shipbuilding, coal or steel sectors. 
 
In general, an investment instrument contains state aid when the investor does not behave as 
a “private investor” seeking to earn a return which is commensurate to the level of risk he 
assumes. In other words, a private investor makes investments on market terms and ignores 
any public policy objectives. 
 
According to the RCG, state aid may be present at four different levels: the investment fund, 
the investors, the fund managers or the enterprises in which investments are finally made. If 
there is state aid at the level of the fund, investors or fund managers, the Commission 
presumes that there is also state aid for the enterprises invested in, irrespective of whether 
investment decisions are made on purely commercial grounds. This is because a state measure 
stimulates the growth in the supply of available capital. 
 
Concerning the compatibility of state aid with the internal market, the RCG define two sets of 
criteria: those that are used in the “standard assessment” (section 4.3) and those for the 
“detailed assessment” (section 5). Any risk capital measure that satisfies all of the criteria for 
the standard assessment is considered to be compatible with the internal market without any 
further analysis to prove that it fulfils the three fundamental requirements for all types of state 
aid that is found to be compatible with the internal market: namely that there is actual market 
failure, that aid is necessary and proportional and that the distortion caused by the aid is 
limited. 
 
When a measure which has one or more features that deviate from the conditions laid down in 
the RCG for the standard assessment it is then subject to the detailed assessment. This 
assessment is based on the principles embodied in the “refined economic approach” used by 
the Commission since 2005 and which is applied in the form of the so-called balancing test. 
This test, as its name suggests, balances the positive effects (i.e. well designed objective of 
common interest) against the negative effects (i.e. distortion of competition) of state aid. A 
state aid measure is found to be compatible with the internal market only when its positive 
effects outweigh its negative effects. Below there is a summary of the criteria used in the 
standard and detailed assessments. 
                                                 
7
 Ad hoc measures are excluded from the scope of the Guidelines. Par. 2.1.  
8
 The funding though resources of the European Investment Bank and the European Investment fund is 
therefore explicitly not covered by the Guidelines, as the funds made available by these bodies do not 
constitute state resources in the meaning of 107.1 TFEU. Par. 3.2 RCG.  
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I.2.1 Standard assessment 
The Commission uses a series of indicators to measure whether the incentive effect and the 
necessity criteria as defined in section 1.3.4 are fulfilled. The guidelines lay down specific safe-
harbour thresholds relating to the tranches of investment in SMEs in their early stages of 
business activity. If these requirements are not met, the Commission will proceed with a 
detailed assessment of the measure. 
 
Six criteria have to be cumulatively met so that a measure can pass the standard assessment.  
1) The maximum level of investment tranches per SME – whether wholly or partly financed 
through State aid - may not exceed EUR 2.5 million per target SME over each period of twelve 
months. (4.3.1) The original amount was EUR 1.5 but in 2010 it was raised to EUR 2.5 million 
per SME.9 The threshold does not refer to the amount of the aid, but the amount of risk capital 
provided to the SME. 
2) The RCG defines the different phases of development of an SME: seed, start-up and 
expansion10. Investments may be made up to the expansion stage for small enterprises, or for 
medium-sized enterprises in assisted areas and up to the start-up stage for medium-sized 
enterprises in non-assisted areas. ( 4.3.2) 
3) At least 70% of the budget must be in the form of equity11 and quasi-equity12 instruments. 
(4.3.3) 
4) At least 50% of the investments must be provided by private investors or 30% in the case of 
SMEs in assisted areas. (4.3.4) The private participation includes all funding which is not “state 
resource” in the meaning of Article 107(1). Financing from the EIB and EIF is considered to be 
private funding.  
5) In order to determine the profit-driven character of the investment decision, the RCG sets 
up three requirements which have to be met cumulatively. (4.3.5) Investments must be made 
for profit with significant involvement of private investors. A business plan must establish ex 
ante viability. A clear and realistic exit strategy must exist for each investment. 
6) The management of the measure must be made on a commercial basis, i.e. like the 
management of the private sector, seeking to maximise the return on the investment. (4.3.6). 
The Guidelines set out three conditions which have to be met for this criterion to be fulfilled. 
The manager’s remuneration is linked to performance and there are clearly defined fund 
objectives and timing of investments. Private market investors are represented in decision-
making, e.g. investors’ advisory committee. Best practices and regulatory supervision apply to 
the management of funds. 
 
Lastly, it is worth pointing out a significant difference between the RCG and the risk capital 
provisions of the General Block Exemption Regulation 800/2008. Under the RCG, the state may 
                                                 
9
 Communication from the Commission amending the Community guidelines on State aid to promote 
risk capital investments in small and medium-sized enterprises, OJ C 329, 7/12/2010, p.4. 
10
 RCG 2.2 (e)-(h).  
11
 RCG 2.2(a). 
12
 RCG 2.2(c).  
Phedon Nicolaides Financial Engineering Instruments and their Assessment Under EU State Aid Rules 
 9 
contribute to funds which then invest into SMEs or may invest directly with other investors 
into SMEs. Under the GBER, the state can contribute only to funds which then invest in SMEs. 
I.2.2 Detailed assessment 
Whenever one or more requirements of the standard assessment are not met, the 
Commission follows the detailed assessment procedure. The requirements of this type of 
assessment as enumerated in section 5.2 are not exhaustive, so the Commission does not have 
to conclude from the presence of one or more elements that the measure is compatible. 
Depending on the form of the measure, the Commission may check the applicability of these 
conditions, and the weight attached to them in particular cases. The burden of proof lays with 
the Member States which have to provide information to demonstrate that the measure is 
proportional to the level of market failure and that the risk of crowding out private investment 
is not excessive.  
 
(a) Positive effects of aid 
1) 5.2.1 Existence and evidence of market failure 
This is shown by equity gap due to high risk, incomplete information or transaction costs. 
2) 5.2.2 Appropriateness of the instrument 
This is shown by the relative ineffectiveness of other policy measures. 
3) 5.2.3 Incentive effect and necessity of aid 
i) Commercial management: The fund should be managed by professionals chosen according 
to a transparent, non-discriminatory procedure, preferably an open tender, with proven 
experience and a track record. 
ii) Presence of an investment committee: There should be an investment committee, 
independent of the fund manager and composed of independent experts, and preferably also 
of representatives of investors. 
iii) Size of the measure/fund: The budget should be of a sufficient size to take advantage of 
economies of scale in administering the fund, to diversify risk and to absorb transaction costs 
iv) Presence of business angels. 
4) 5.2.4 Proportionality 
Investors should not be overcompensated, the risk of losses should not be borne entirely by 
the public sector and the benefits should not flow entirely to private investors. In particular 
there should be: 
ii) Open tender for managers. 
ii) Call for tender or public invitation to investors. 
 
 
(b)  Negative effects of aid 
1) 5.3.1 Crowding-out 
There is crowding out if public funds compete with private funds for the same enterprises. 
Evidence of non-competition has to be provided. 
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2) 5.3.2 Other distortions of competition 
Investments should not be made into inefficient companies and the size of such investments 
must not be out of proportion in relation to their turnover. 
 
(c)  The “balancing test” 
Detailed assessment of state aid is based on the idea of the “balancing test” which was 
introduced by the State Aid Action Plan of 2005 and has been refined in a Staff Working Paper 
on “Common Principles for an Economic Assessment of the Compatibility of State Aid under 
Article 107(3)”.13 
 
As the Action Plan put it, “... appreciating the compatibility of state aid is fundamentally about 
balancing the negative effects of aid on competition with its positive effects in terms of 
common interest.” Therefore, the balancing test, first, identifies all the possible effects of state 
aid and, then, compares them in order to determine the overall effect. 
 
The decisional practice of the Commission that I have extensively reviewed elsewhere14 reveals 
that, at the risk of not much exaggeration, the single most decisive element in the application 
of the balancing test is the establishment of a credible, data-based, “counterfactual”. This is a 
description of what would happen with and without the aid. 
 
By examining counterfactuals, the Commission can determine whether state aid has an 
incentive effect, i.e. it can influence the behaviour of the beneficiaries, and then calculate how 
much aid is required in order to bring about the desired change in the behaviour of the aid 
recipients. These are the tasks of proving the necessity and proportionality of aid. The formula 
that can accomplish to a large extent both of these tasks is the estimation of the net present 
value (NPV) or the internal rate of return (IRR) of a project. At one stroke, the NPV or the IRR 
reveals whether a project would not be undertaken without aid and also how much aid needs 
to be pumped into a project to make it attractive for an enterprise in order to commit its own 
money. 
 
Counterfactuals are the bread and butter of balancing tests and measures of NPV or IRR are 
routinely required by the Commission. With respect to aid for R&D, for example, the 
Commission focused its detailed assessment on quantitative estimations of profitability and in-
                                                 
13
  18 May 2009. It can be accessed at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/reform/economic_assessment_en.pdf  
14
 P. Nicolaides, Economic Analysis of State Aid: An Assessment of the Balancing Test and its Application 
in the Draft Framework on State Aid to Research, Development and Innovation, “European State Aid 
Law Quarterly”, 2006; P. Nicolaides, Compatibility of State Aid and the Balancing Test: Its Role in the 
Architecture of the System of State Aid Control, Presented at the Third Annual Conference of the Global 
Competition Law Centre, College of Europe, Bruges (B) on Economic Analysis of State Aid Rules, 21-22 
September 2006; P. Nicolaides and I. Rusu, The Binary Nature of the Economics of State Aid, “Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration”, 2009. 
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depth analysis of market structures and market players.15 Yet, the cases which are reviewed 
below reveal a different picture as far as risk capital is concerned. The quantitative evidence 
required appears to be paltry by comparison. It is not that the Commission does not require 
evidence. On the contrary, it demands extensive market surveys of the alleged market failure. 
However, it appears to be satisfied with general arrangements concerning the amount of 
capital injected in SMEs and qualitative conditions imposed on the companies invested in.  
 
I.3. Cases 
This section reviews four representative cases which established the practice of the European 
Commission and demonstrate how the Commission assesses in detail risk capital measures. 
They reveal what appear to be the main concerns of the Commission and the type of evidence 
that is acceptable to the Commission. 
 
I.3.1.   N 700/2007, Finance Wales JEREMIE Fund, UK 
 
(a) Objective and market failure 
The Finance Wales JEREMIE Fund (hereinafter FWJF) aims at the provision of risk capital 
support and of loans to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in Wales. The market 
failure is present up to the expansion phase of SMEs with an investment limit of £2 million. The 
FWJF provides SMEs with loans from £5000 to £25000 and debt facilities from £25001 to £1 
million. All loans are provided under market conditions. The interest charged on loans is set in 
compliance with the Commission Communication on reference and discount rates. The FWJF is 
managed by a Holding Fund in line with the Commission’s JEREMIE model. This Holding Fund 
has a dedicated Investor Board to oversee its management. All investment decisions are taken 
by an independently appointed Investment Committee. 
The fund managers are selected through open tender. Fund managers are contracted to 
generate a set internal rate of return for the funds under their management. Their 
performance based remuneration is linked to targets set out in the fund management 
contract. 
 
(b) State aid assessment 
Existence of state aid: 
With respect to the loans which are provided to SMEs under market conditions, the 
Commission concludes that they do not constitute state aid. At the level of investors, the 
Commission finds that there is no state aid because public and private investors share exactly 
the same upside and downside risks and rewards and hold the same level of subordination, 
and at least 50 percent of the funding of the measure is provided by private investors, which 
                                                 
15
 See, for example, Commission decisions on French aid to Siemens & Lohr for metro trains, N674/06; 
French aid to Alcatel-Lucent for unlimited mobile tv, N 854/2006; Spanish aid to ITP, C9/2007; Swedish 
aid to Volvo Aero, C33/2008; German aid to RR Deutschland, N195/2007. 
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are independent from the companies in which they invest. There is also no state aid for the 
fund and the fund managers. The fund is a vehicle for channelling resources to final recipients 
while the fund managers are selected according to competitive selection procedures. 
 
Despite finding no state aid for investors, the fund or the fund managers, the Commission 
concludes that it cannot exclude the presence of an advantage for the target enterprises 
because only a limited number of SMEs can benefit from the partly public financing of the 
fund. 
 
Compatibility of state aid: 
The measure complies with all the criteria for the standard assessment in the RCG except two: 
i) the maximum tranches (about EUR 2.5 million) exceeds the RCG ceiling of EUR 1.5 million 
which was in force at the time of the assessment and ii) finance is provided beyond the start-
up stage for medium sized enterprises located in non-assisted areas. For these two reasons, 
the Commission carried out a detailed assessment. 
The UK submitted information demonstrating that the market failure was present up to £2 
million in the expansion phase of SMEs. This market failure covered medium-sized enterprises 
located in non-assisted areas. On the basis of this information and because the measure was 
designed according to EIB/EIF recommendations, the Commission concluded that the evidence 
showed the necessity of the proposed fund and that the threshold of tranches and the 
investments into medium-sized enterprises located in non-assisted areas were compatible 
with the internal market. 
 
 
I.3.2. NN 45/2009, Venture Capital Scheme, Land of Styria, Austria 
(a) Objective and market failure 
The scheme consisted of two measures. The first measure was the basis for provision of start-
up capital in the form and under similar conditions as in case N 403/2002 which was found not 
to constitute state aid. Under the second measure, seed capital was provided to micro-sized 
undertakings directly by the StBFG and no participation of private investors was envisaged. The 
scheme was not organized as a fund with a separate legal personality. The StBFG as the aid 
granting authority would invest directly into target undertakings. For the start-up investments, 
gains and losses would be shared equally by the private investors and the StBFG. 
 
The investments under the scheme would be granted to micro- and small-sized enterprises 
established in Styria. The need of a specific risk capital instrument in Styria was based on the 
deficiency in access to private equity investments for newly created companies in the early 
stage of their existence. Investors were reluctant to provide financing to undertakings at the 
early stage of their existence. The private equity gap in financing at the seed stage was 
demonstrated by the data on newly created undertakings. In 2007, there were 30,501 new 
undertakings founded in Austria, of which 3,749 in Styria. Of the Styrian newly established 
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undertakings only 2 received private equity investment at the seed-stage. Information on the 
demand for private equity investments at the seed stage showed that in 2007, 35 undertakings 
in Austria and two undertakings in Styria sought seed capital investments and only 5 (in Styria 
one) were successful. In 2008, there were 12 (none in Styria) successful candidates of 37 (one 
in Styria). 
 
(b) State aid assessment 
StBFG used state resources and the measure was attributed to the state. For the start-up 
programme, there was no advantage to investors and therefore no state aid because they 
invested at least 50% of the funds in eligible enterprises. For the seed capital programme, 
there may be state aid for investors because StBFG may invest more than 50%. 
 
There was no state aid at the level of the fund because StBFG received no advantage since it 
acted as a vehicle through which capital would flow to final beneficiaries. Furthermore, no 
separate fund was established. At the level of the fund managers, there was also no state aid 
because no fund had been established. For the recipients of start-up capital there was no state 
aid because there was no state aid at higher level. The Commission pointed out that there 
might be state aid for the recipients of seed capital because StBFG may invest more than 50% 
of total equity. 
 
In the assessment of the compatibility of the seed capital programme the Commission 
proceeded as follows: 
1. Maximum level of investment tranches: The limit in the RCG was respected because the 
maximum investment was EUR 300,000. 
2. Restriction to seed and start-up financing: Only seed capital was provided to small 
enterprises. 
3. Prevalence of equity and quasi-equity investment instruments: Only equity finance would 
be provided. 
4. Commercial management: No remuneration was provided to StBFG. However, the 
requirement of performance-linked incentive was inherent in the exit strategy of the 
scheme. The selection of the target undertakings was carried out on the basis of purely 
commercial interests and that the StBFG disposed of appropriate expertise in order to 
qualify for such selection. 
 
(c) Detailed assessment for the seed capital programme which may involve no private 
investor 
Positive effects of the aid 
Existence of market failure: There was a gap in private equity financing at the seed stage. 
Access to private equity capital at the seed stage was even more limited than at the early stage 
in general due to the higher risk involved. An independent study showed that during the 
previous five-year period, seed capital was oscillating between EUR 10 million and zero. The 
investment activity of the Austrian private equity and venture capital funds was below the EU 
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average. Potential private venture investors fear mainly the high level of risk and uncertainty 
of revenues of such investments, which further increased at the seed stage. 
 
Negative effects of the aid 
Crowding out private investment: The RCG acknowledge that private investors are reluctant or 
largely unwilling to provide seed capital. This implies no or very limited risk of crowding-out. 
Furthermore, there is reduced potential for distortion of competition due to the significant 
distance from the market of these small-size enterprises. The key argument of the non-
existence of risk of the crowding-out effect of the present measure was the fact that of 3,749 
newly created undertakings in Styria in 2007 only 2 received private equity investment at the 
seed-stage. In 2008 the situation further worsened: 2 of 3,977. Furthermore, aid would be 
modest. The aid was therefore found to be compatible with the internal market. 
 
 
 
I.3.3.  N 406/2009, Clusterfonds, Bavaria, Germany 
(a) Objective and market failure 
The scheme aimed at filling the shortage in private share capital that affects newly established, 
technology focused micro- and small enterprises at their seed stage. Eligible enterprises were 
those seated or having an establishment in Bavaria. According to an independent study, only 
21% of venture capitalists surveyed were ready to provide seed capital. The German 
authorities made an estimation of the potential demand and current supply of seed 
investments in Bavaria and provided documentation to demonstrate that, taking into account 
regional aspects of the scheme, an equity gap on the seed capital market in Bavaria existed. 
More than 90% of the potential demand for seed capital in Bavaria was not met by supply. 
 
The German authorities also assessed the effectiveness of alternatives to the notified risk 
capital instrument. They argued that non-selective instruments, in particular tax advantages, 
would not provide a sufficient stimulus. Target enterprises would not generate profits in the 
foreseeable future and such tax instruments would thus not generate an incentive to reduce 
the tax amount on income received. 
 
Aid in the form of loans and direct grants was unsuitable to address the financing gap in the 
seed phase, which is characterised by high losses and, as a rule, by the lack of collateral. As 
such aid is to be granted for specific, individual projects and it could only serve as a 
supplement to more flexible financing. Besides, such aid would not be available to the extent 
actually required by the target enterprises, due to budgetary and regulatory-policy reasons. 
 
The measure would be implemented by a Fund established by LfA which is a bank for the 
support of economic development in Bavaria and is a body governed by public law. LfA is an 
integral part of the state administration. The Fund’s initial capital of EUR 24 million would be 
provided by LfA. The Fund would be managed by BKG, which is 100% owned by LfA. BKG had 
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not been selected by an open tender procedure. Hence, public tender rules and provisions did 
not apply. 
 
The remuneration of BKG consisted of two components. As a first part there would be an 
annual management fee of 2.5% of the amount accounting for 50% of the money invested by 
the Fund during the first two years and 2.5% of the total amount of the money invested by the 
Fund starting from the third year. After five years, the management fee would be calculated on 
the basis of the money invested, after deduction of repayments and successful sales and 
completed insolvencies until the end of the previous year. VAT would be added to the 
management fee. As a performance fee, which was the second part of the remuneration, BKG 
would be entitled to receive 10% of the profits from successful exits if a hurdle rate of 6% p.a. 
for the investments of the other owners of the Fund was attained. The management fee was in 
line with market benchmarks. 
 
(b) State aid assessment 
The Fund was endowed with capital provided by public authorities. Private investors may 
obtain an advantage because it was not certain that they would make at least 50% of 
investments in recipient companies. The Fund itself acted as an intermediary for the 
channelling of capital to final beneficiaries. The Fund would not diversify into any other 
activities than those necessary for the implementation of the notified measure. Therefore, it 
obtained no advantage and no state aid. 
 
The Fund manager, i.e. BKG, would receive remuneration that was in line with market 
conditions for fund-management services. According to established Commission practice such 
remuneration entails no state aid.16 Furthermore, the selection of BKG without public tender is 
compliant with the relevant EU law on public procurement because (i) BKG is fully controlled 
by the state and (ii) carries out the essential part of its activities with the state (i.e. manages 
state investments).17 
 
Targeted enterprises also received state aid because the measure was selective and it could 
not be excluded that aid at the level of investors would not be passed on to beneficiary 
enterprises. 
 
Compatibility 
The measure was found compatible with the internal market because it satisfied all the criteria 
in the Risk Capital Guidelines. 
1. Maximum level of investment tranches: The maximum amount of EUR 500,000 per 
undertaking is below the ceiling of EUR 2.5 million. 
2. Restriction to seed-, start-up and expansion financing: The measure was limited to seed 
capital. 
                                                 
16
 See N 478/2008 Hannover Beteiligungsfonds; N 696/2007 EFRE-Risikokapitalfonds Brandenburg. 
17
 See C-458/03 Parking Brixen. 
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3. Prevalence of equity and quasi-equity investment instruments: Since silent participation 
did not exceed 30%, equity and quasi-equity investments would be at least 70%, as 
required by the RCG. 
4. Commercial management: The Fund was be managed commercially. The management’s 
remuneration was linked to performance and investments were made with a clear exit 
strategy. Private market investors were represented in decision-making. Best practices 
applied and the Fund was be under regulatory supervision. 
5. Participation by private investors: Although the RCG require that at least 50% of the 
funding must be provided by private investors, the Fund may invest without any private 
investor. For this reason the Commission applied the balancing test. 
 
Positive effects 
Existence of market failure: 
The number of newly established high-technology enterprises was declining on the long run. 
Financial resources for enterprises in their seed phase were rather limited. Small enterprises 
could not finance themselves from the operating cash-flows. Access to external financing 
through banks, which counted for almost 19% of overall finance of high-technology enterprises 
failed due to stricter requirements regarding creditworthiness. Only 21% of the venture capital 
providers invested in enterprises in their seed-phase (younger than 1 year). Venture capital 
providers preferred to invest in enterprises older than 1 year with a turnover of more than EUR 
100,000. Moreover, Bavaria lacked a sufficient supply of risk capital. 
 
Incentive effect and necessity of the aid: 
The RCG stipulate that the incentive effect of risk capital aid measures plays a crucial role in 
the compatibility assessment. There is an incentive effect when all the conditions in section 4 
of the RCG are present as well. The Commission assessed the following: 
Commercial management: The Fund manager operated on a commercial basis but it had not 
been selected through a competitive procedure. 
Presence of an investment committee: Although private investors were represented in 
decision making, it was not possible to determine its composition beforehand. 
Size of the measure/fund: The Fund’s size was sufficient and the risk was adequately 
diversified. There was also no doubt that the Fund’s transaction costs could be absorbed. 
Presence of Business Angels: Although business angels might not intervene concomitantly with 
each Fund investment, the measure’s aim to involve this category of venture capitalists was to 
be considered positively. 
 
Proportionality of the aid: 
The Commission considered that a transparent, non-discriminatory open tender for the choice 
of the management company and a public invitation to investors positively influence the 
assessment of proportionality as they represent a best-practice approach. The Commission 
found that the aid was proportionate because BKG would be remunerated commercially and 
that there would be a published invitation to investors. 
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Negative effects of the aid 
Crowding out private investment: 
There would be no investments in cases where private funding was possible. Prior to each 
investment, the Fund management would scrutinise whether financing from a private venture 
capital fund or business angel was possible. 
 
The Fund would not act as a lead investor. The Fund investments were targeting a demand 
that private venture capital funds were not ready to meet. The average investment tranche in 
Bavarian seed enterprises (in the period 2005-2009) made by private investors (venture capital 
funds) amounted to EUR 760,000 p.a. The ceiling of the Fund for each investment/enterprise 
p.a. was EUR 250,000. 
 
The Fund would invested in target enterprises younger than those funded by private investors 
and at a very early business stage. The Fund’s target enterprises must not be older than 1 year 
to be eligible for the first investment. By contrast, only 8% of private venture capital providers 
invested in enterprises that were younger than 1 year. The RCG themselves stipulate that the 
reluctance and near absence of private investors to provide seed capital, implies no or very 
limited risk of crowding-out. 
 
Balancing positive and negative effects of the aid 
The Commission considered positively the fact that the investment was provided in form of 
equity or quasi-equity to young innovative companies only in their seed-stage. Furthermore 
the investment tranche was limited to a point that was far below the maximum investment 
tranche as foreseen in the Guidelines. The scheme tackled a well-identified equity gap on the 
relevant seed capital market and could be considered as an appropriate measure to encourage 
private risk capital investment. Even though the Fund’s management was not selected through 
an open tender, the Fund would be managed commercially. The size of the Fund was sufficient 
and private investors were openly invited on a European level. The measure would apply only 
in cases where no private investors could be found. In the end the Commission considered that 
the positive effects prevail. 
 
 
I.3.4.  N 722/2009, Risk Capital Aid Scheme, Region Lazio, Italy 
(a) Objective 
Region Lazio intended to set up a 100% public investment fund in order to make risk capital 
investments into start-ups and SMEs in Region Lazio with leveraged private funding. Region 
Lazio planned to establish a revolving fund that would be constituted as separate account fund 
within FILAS, which was a company established by Region Lazio for the purpose of dealing with 
risk capital measures and the support of innovation activities. FILAS was a joint stock company, 
100% owned by Region Lazio. The fund would be managed by FILAS as a financial intermediary. 
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A committee would scrutinize proposed investment projects on the basis of their profitability 
and financial aspects and would check the lawfulness of each investment. This committee was 
composed by five members. Three of its members were chosen on the basis of an open public 
tender procedure. The remaining two members would be appointed by Region Lazio. 
 
FILAS for its activities received fees of a maximum of 2% per year of the total amount of the 
fund for the entire investment period and of a maximum 1% per year of the total amount 
actually engaged during the divestment period. FILAS would publicise the fund in order to find 
co-investors interested to invest together with the fund in the SMEs. 
 
The fund would invest in SMEs established in Region Lazio up to their expansion stage, both in 
assisted and non assisted areas. For this purpose, FILAS would announce a call for projects that 
would set all the criteria for eligibility for an investee enterprise. The estimated number of 
investee enterprises ranged between 11 to 50 enterprises. 
 
Under the measure, for the investments in the equity or quasi-equity of an SME, the 
distribution of the risks and of the profits was asymmetric. According to the Italian authorities, 
the asymmetric profit distribution in favour of the successful operations was the most 
appropriate instrument to attract private investors and to develop a risk capital market in 
Region Lazio, especially since the fund would intervene only on the higher risk segment of the 
market, and the costs of transaction were primarily under the responsibility of the co-investor. 
 
(b) State aid assessment 
The Commission found that there was state aid for co-investors because of the preferential 
treatment they received in the distribution of profits. 
 
There was no state aid for the fund that had been established as a separate account within 
FILAS. Its purpose was only to act as an intermediary vehicle for the transfer of aid and it 
would not carry out any other function. With respect to the fund manager, the fund 
management was carried out by FILAS and by the investment committee. In particular, the 
overall management of the fund was assigned to FILAS and final investment decisions would 
be made by the investment committee. FILAS was not chosen through an open and 
transparent public tender. However, the Commission considered that 2% management fee 
received by FILAS was in line with market remuneration in comparable situations. 
Furthermore, the Commission had generally accepted a remuneration of 2% as appropriate in 
Art. 43 of Regulation 1828/2006. With regard to the investment committee, the Commission 
noted its two-layer structure. On the one hand, three of its members were selected on the 
basis of an open tender procedure and their remuneration was linked to the investment 
results according to normal market practice. On the other hand, the remaining two members 
were civil servants that did not receive any additional remuneration. The Commission 
concluded that there was no state aid at the level of the fund’s management. 
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At the level of the final beneficiaries, the Commission considers that where aid is present at 
the level of the investors, it is at least partly passed on to the target enterprises and thus that 
it is also present at their level. This is the case even where investment decisions are being 
taken by the managers of the fund with a purely commercial logic. 
 
Compatibility of state aid 
The following features of the measure were found to be compatible with the RCG: 
1. Maximum level of investment tranches: The maximum amount per undertaking did not 
exceed EUR 1.5 million 
2. Prevalence of equity and quasi-equity investments: At least 70% of funds were in the form 
of equity or quasi-equity. 
3. Profit-driven character of investment decisions: Investments were made only for profit and 
on the basis of a detailed business plan and a clear and realistic exit strategy. Private 
investors were significantly involved in investment decisions. And the final decision was 
made by independent committee. 
 
The following were found not to comply with the conditions of the standard assessment of the 
RCG and for this reason the Commission carried out a detailed assessment: 
1. The measure provided for investments during the expansion stage of medium-sized 
enterprises outside assisted areas. 
2. Participation of private investors: The minimum private participation for high-risk 
investments in non-assisted areas was only 40% instead of 50%. 
3. Commercial management: FILAS’s remuneration was not linked to performance. Nor was 
there an overall agreement at the level of the fund on investment performance. 
 
(c) Detailed assessment 
Existence and evidence of market failure: It is difficult for enterprises to find external finance 
due to high transactions for investors. According to an independent study, enterprises with 
turnover between EUR 2 and 10 million were not attractive to venture capitalists because they 
preferred enterprises with turnover between EUR 10 and 100 million. 
 
Geographic market failure: The relevant market failure in Region Lazio was present up to the 
expansion phase of SMEs, irrespective of whether they were located in assisted or non-
assisted areas. Investments in the region accounted for about half of national rates as 
percentage of GDP. 
 
Appropriateness of state aid instrument: The 100% public fund was necessary to attract 
investors primarily located in Northern Italy. Initial interviews with venture capitalists indicated 
that they would want to invest on a deal by deal basis instead of being involved at the level of 
the fund so as to exercise control on their investments. The measure was part of the regional 
OP which was assessed positively by the Commission. 
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Proportionality: The measure did not feature those elements which would automatically imply 
that it cannot be considered proportionate: 
i. the measure did not provide for the risk of losses being borne entirely by the public sector, 
as for example in case of a complete loss of the capital invested, both the public and the 
private investor would lose all their capital; 
ii. the measure did not provide for the benefits of the investments to flow entirely to the 
private co-investors. 
 
The invitations to co-investors were done through public, transparent and non-discriminatory 
procedures. The selection of the co-investors would be based on the requirements laid down 
in the invitation and the procedure would remain open to new entrants during the scheme. 
This was a first element to help to ensure absence of overcompensation at the level of 
investors. Both losses and profits were medicated through a pre-determined formula. 
 
Incentive effect and necessity of aid: 
1. Commercial management: Only two of the three conditions in the RCG were met [i.e. 
representation of private investors in decision making and compliance with best practices 
and regulatory supervision]. However, the absence of performance-based fee for FILAS 
was due to its public nature, while the fee for the three independent members of the 
committee was linked to investment performance. Moreover, the fund respected Art 43 of 
Reg 1828/2006 on financial engineering instruments. 
2. Presence of investment committee: The majority of the members of the investment 
committee were independent professionals. 
3. Size of fund: The fund had EUR 20 million to which resources of co-investors were added. 
This amount was considered sufficient enough to absorb transaction costs. 
 
Negative effects of aid: 
1. The fund only invested in parallel with co-investors in order to achieve a leverage effect. 
2. No negative effect on private investors was expected because the open structure of the 
fund allowed the involvement of more co-investors. 
3. Inefficient companies would not be kept afloat as investment were made only in 
enterprises that were likely to be profitable. 
4. No or little crowding out effects because the fund invested when co-investors agreed to 
invest. 
 
On the basis of the aforementioned consideration, the Commission found that the positive 
effects outweighed the negative effects. 
 
I.4. Evaluation 
The purpose of this section is to identify the factors that appear to be decisive in influencing 
the Commission’s treatment of risk capital measures which are subject to detailed assessment. 
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As explained earlier, detailed assessment is undertaken in those cases where the measure 
under consideration deviates from the standard conditions laid down in the RCG. This section 
concludes with a few observations concerning the application of the balancing test in risk 
capital as compared to its application in other state aid areas. 
 
 
I.4.1. Existence and evidence of market failure 
Identified important factors: Surveys of investor opinion expressing their reluctance to invest 
are the main evidence of equity gap. The Commission also accepts quantitative evidence that 
shows little investment activity in favour of SMEs in particular regions, relative to national or 
European averages. 
 
I.4.2.  Appropriateness of the instrument 
Identified important factors: Instruments other than state aid are unavailable or less effective 
in inducing investors to commit funds to SMEs, most often because they cannot reduce risk. 
 
I.4.3.  Incentive effect and necessity of aid 
Identified important factors: Investment funds should ideally be managed by professionals 
chosen through a competitive procedure. Decisions should be made by independent 
committees involving private investors. The presence of business angels is always a positive 
element. 
 
I.4.4.  Proportionality 
Identified important factors: To avoid overcompensation of managers or investors, managers 
should be chosen through a competitive procedure and their remuneration should be linked to 
their performance, while investors should also be selected through an open procedure. 
Limitations on the amount of profit that private investors can make and allowing for the 
possibility of loss of capital are positive elements. 
 
I.4.5. Avoiding crowding-out 
Identified important factors: Investments should be made in firms that have been refused 
funding or are not able to find funding or have secured partial funding from private investors. 
Investments made on the basis of a credible business plan reduce the likelihood of support of 
non-viable enterprises. 
 
To recapitulate, the application of the balancing test in risk capital cases seems to focus largely 
on two factors: i) the views of market participants concerning the prospects of investment in 
SMEs and ii) the legal obligations and constraints imposed on investors and fund managers. 
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By contrast, the application of the balancing test in other cases of state aid emphasises a more 
thorough analysis of counterfactual scenarios, quantitative measures of the profitability of 
aided projects and analysis of market structures and market players. 
This is a surprising difference because the approach in risk capital cases does not at first sight 
appear to conform with the aim of the refined economic approach, which is to utilise more 
quantitative methods for evaluating state aid. 
 
Yet, on further consideration, it is an understandable difference. Risk capital is injected in 
whole enterprises without being limited to a specific project whose profitability can be 
measured. This probably is also the reason why the RCG are rather unusual among 
Commission guidelines in not defining a maximum rate of allowable aid intensity, apart from 
the overall ceiling of EUR 2.5 million. 
 
This finding, however, does not mean that Member States should not pay due attention to 
thorough analysis of prevailing market conditions and of the impact of the aid they propose to 
grant. It only means that their risk capital notifications have to be presented in a different 
format with emphasis on proof of equity gap and on the structure of the aid measure rather 
than quantitative estimates of needed amounts of aid or market shares. 
 
I.5. Conclusions  
Part I of the paper has shed light on a rather obscure area of the Commission’s decisional 
practice and has examined how the Risk Capital Guidelines are applied in practice. On the basis 
of the measures that have been reviewed, the paper can draw a conclusion which is at first 
glance surprising but on reflection not so unexpected. This conclusion is that, surprisingly, the 
Commission has approved all but one risk capital measures. These measures can be quite 
complex and therefore there are many possibilities for disagreement between the Commission 
and Member States. This should have led to more negative decisions. 
 
But on reflection, this outcome is not so unexpected because this is exactly the purpose of the 
guidelines. They are intended to guide Member States to design measures which the 
Commission will be in a position to approve. Moreover, in most instances there are multiple, 
formal and informal, meetings between the Commission and national authorities. In the 
process Member States adjust their measures in order to address the concerns of the 
Commission and allay its doubts. Of course, as is always the case when one draws conclusions 
from publicly available information, one never knows how many measures are eventually 
withdrawn after informal contact and before they are formally notified to the Commission. 
 
However, closer scrutiny of the measures that have been subject to detailed assessment 
suggests that there may have been other factors at play. These factors are the special nature 
of state aid in risk capital and the virtual absence from the RCG of quantitative thresholds of 
compatible aid. With respect to the necessity of aid, it is rather easy for Member States to 
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demonstrate it by showing the existence of extensive and pervasive market failure in the 
funding of SMEs. Such failure has been documented at length by EU institutions such as the 
Commission and by the EIB/EIF. With respect to the proportionality of aid and the avoidance of 
undue distortion to competition, it has also been rather easy for the Commission and the 
Member States to avoid unbridgeable disagreements. Simply invested funds have to remain 
below the maximum allowable tranches. There is no need to measure eligible costs and aid 
intensities. Undue distortions are avoided by limiting investment to companies not supplied by 
capital markets. But this is already achieved by the fact that market failure is already shown to 
exist.  
 
Phedon Nicolaides Financial Engineering Instruments and their Assessment Under EU State Aid Rules 
 24 
Annex I.1: Main risk capital measures for which the Commission completed an in depth 
assessment 
 
This list is not exhaustive. It contains the main measures subject to detailed assessment. It 
does not include subsequent changes or modifications that have also been assessed in detail. 
 
 
C 36/2005 Investbx United Kingdom 
N 758/2006 Régime de capital risqué dans les DOM, France 
N 263/2007 Technology fund TGFS, Saxony, Germany 
N 521/2007 Cluster Fund Start-up, Risk Capital Scheme, Germany (Bavaria) 
N 596a/2007 Investissement dans les PME, France 
N 700/2007 Finance Wales JEREMIE Fund, UK 
N 395/2007 Start-up Fund VERA, Finland 
NN 42b/2007 Venture Capital Trusts United Kingdom 
NN 42a/2007 Enterprise Investment Scheme and Corporate Venturing Scheme, UK 
N 629/2007 Régime cadre d'interventions publiques en capital-investissement regional, 
France 
N 481/2008 Clusterfonds Innovation, Germany 
C 2/2009 Modernisierung der Rahmenbedingungen für Kapitalbeteiligungen, Germany 
[negative decision without recovery] 
N 275/2009 Clusterfonds Bayern, Germany 
N 406/2009 Risikokapitalregelung, Clusterfonds Seed GmbH & Co. KG, Germany 
NN 45/2009 Neufassung des Venture-Capital-Programms (Styria), Austria 
N 722/2009 Risk capital aid scheme, Region Lazio, Italy 
SA.31730 Fonds national d'amorçage – Régime cadre d'intervention publique en capital 
investissement auprès des jeunes entreprises innovantes, France 
SA.32520 Risk Capital Scheme High-Tech Gründerfonds II, Germany 
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Annex I.2: Risk capital measures involving no state aid 
 
These measures have been found not to involve state aid because public authorities 
conformed with the private investor principle. That is, their investments were motivated by 
profit, a reasonable returned was expected and they assumed the same level of risk and 
reward as private co-investors. 
 
N 403/2002 Austria, Venture Capital Scheme, Land of Styria  
N 511/2002 Italy, Fonds capital-investissement (Sardaigne)  
N 34/2005 Germany, German Innovation Initiative  
N 131/2006 Netherlands, Groeifinanciering  
N 194/2006 UK, Screen East Content Investment Fund (CIF)  
N 344/2006 Germany, SBG  
C 33/2007 Germany, IBG Risk capital fund 
N 467/2007 Germany, Creative-Sectors Fund (Berlin)  
N 500/2007 Germany, Technology-Venture Capital Fund (Berlin)  
N 413/2008 Germany, MoRaKG  
N 478/2008 Germany, Hannover Beteiligungsfonds (HBF)  
N 481/2008 Germany, Clusterfonds Innovation 
N 511/2008 Germany, Risk capital in Brandenburg  
NN 45/2009 Austria, Venture Capital Programms des Landes Steiermark  
N 151/2010 Germany, Risikokapitalfonds BFB II (Änderung) 
SA.31651 Italy, Project Amalattea, Istituto Sviluppo Agroalimentare (N 423/2010) (Lazio) 
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Part II:  PUBLIC LOANS AND GUARANTEES 
 
The purpose of Part II of the paper is to review the rules on state aid in public loans and 
guarantees and how they have been enforced in a number of landmark decisions taken by the 
European Commission. More specifically, Part II examines how the Commission determines the 
existence of state aid and how it assesses the compatibility of such aid with the internal 
market. 
 
Since the adoption of the current set of rules on public loans and guarantees in 2008, the 
Commission has taken about 35 decisions dealing specifically with guarantee measures. It has 
not been possible to establish how many decisions refer to loans, but they must be more 
numerous as a result of the measures that have been implemented by Member States on the 
basis of the Temporary Framework that expired at the end of 2011. 
 
Of the 35 or so decisions concerning individual guarantees and guarantee schemes, a large 
majority (about 70%) refer to measures for which the Commission has raised no objections. In 
four cases the Commission initiated the formal investigation procedure. A couple of cases have 
been closed with a negative decision without recovery, while another case has been concluded 
with a negative decision coupled with recovery of incompatible aid.18 This case is analysed in 
the penultimate section of the paper. 
 
It should also be noted that since 2008, the publicly accessible data base on state aid cases, 
which is managed by DG Competition, indicates that there have been about 55 or so cases 
involving a guarantee as an instrument of state aid but having a different primary objective. 
The vast majority of these cases concern i) rescue and/or restructuring of companies in 
difficulty, ii) guarantees (mostly unlimited) to state-owned banks and other state-owned 
entities such as postal undertakings, and iii) export insurance and export guarantees. As far as 
export insurance and guarantees are concerned, the Commission has not authorised any 
measure that contains state aid which covers marketable risks for the simple reason that 
export aid is incompatible with the internal market.19 
 
In addition, state guarantees have been at the centre of more than two hundred measures 
that have been examined by the Commission in the context of the financial crisis and the state 
support to banks. With the exception of the first rescue case that concerned Northern Rock in 
                                                 
18
 See case C 6/2008 (ex NN69/2007), Ålands Industrihus Ab, Finland. 
19
 See Commission Decision 2008/718 on short-term export-credit guarantees for SMEs with limited 
export turnover in Hungary, OJ L 239, 6/9/2008. In particular, the Commission observes the following: 
“(45) Moreover, it is recalled that the Commission has in principle strictly condemned export aid in intra-
Community trade, since export subsidies directly affect competition in the market between rival 
potential suppliers of goods and services. Since it is closely and inseparably linked to the underlying 
trade transaction, such export aid is likely to adversely affect trading conditions to a considerable 
extent. In its previous decisions the Commission clearly indicated that guarantees offered at below 
market price in the context of export contracts within the Community constitute export aid which is 
incompatible with the common market. Moreover, Member States’ support for their exports outside the 
Community can also affect competition within the Community.” 
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December 2007, which was assessed on the basis of Article 107(3)(c), the state aid that has 
been approved in all other cases has been based on Article 107(3)(b) TFEU. It is estimated that 
the total amount of state aid to banks has exceeded EUR 4.5 trillion. From that amount about 
two thirds are made up by guarantees to creditors and other liabilities of banks. Despite such 
enormous amounts, guarantees to banks fall outside the scope of this paper because they 
have been assessed in the context of broader rescue and restructuring plans and not according 
to the Commission Guarantee Notice.20 Moreover, EU courts have had the opportunity to 
review a Commission decision concerning aid to financial institutions only once and the related 
ruling did not examine in any detail the state guarantees that had been granted.21 
 
In addition to presenting the formal rules, Part II of the paper focuses primarily on the various 
methodologies for determining the amount of state aid in loans and guarantees. The main 
findings of Part II are as follows. Although the principles concerning the existence of state aid 
in loans and guarantees are few and fairly easy to define and understand, their application in 
each particular case can be complicated. This is because the rules can be used both to prove 
the absence of aid and the existence of aid. In addition, whether state aid exists or not very 
much depends on the choice of the right market benchmark. Just as in the cases concerning 
the application of the market economy investor principle or, as sometimes called, the private 
investor principle, the challenge is to identify the benchmark that conveys a true picture of 
how private investors would behave. In this respect, the quantification of possible advantages 
in financial transactions is always tricky. Another reason of the complexity in the application of 
the rules is that although in general it is the borrower who obtains the benefit of state aid, 
occasionally state aid may indirectly benefit the lender as well. Therefore, the next section 
examines how the beneficiaries of aid can be identified. 
 
II.1. Existence of state aid: Who benefits? 
 
A zero- or low-interest loan benefits the borrower, not the lender because the latter forgoes 
potential revenue. Similarly, a guarantee subsidised by the state benefits the borrower, not 
the lender, even if the lender is a private bank. This is because the lender merely charges a 
market rate of interest on the loan, which, among other things, reflects the credit worthiness 
of the borrower, including the fact that the loan is backed by a state guarantee. 
 
Any lender offering a loan under competitive market conditions would charge a rate of interest 
that covers its actual and expected costs which are primarily its administrative costs, the 
                                                 
20
 Official Journal C 155 of 20/6/2008, p. 10. 
21
 See joined cases T-29/10 and T-33/10, Netherlands and ING v European Commission. The General 
Court partly annulled the Commission Decision against which the appeals had been lodged because the 
Commission failed to appreciate that early repayment of the state funds that had been injected into ING 
reduced the risk borne by the state and that reduction could justify the payment of interest at a rate 
lower than that which had been initially agreed and which concerned a longer period of time. This 
reasoning is relevant to this paper because it shows that risk and compensation or risk and premiums 
are directly linked. 
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return it must earn on its capital and a risk premium. Since lending always involves a risk, the 
rate charged by the lender must include a risk premium in order to compensate for the 
possibility that the loan may not be repaid. A guarantee by the state reduces that risk but does 
not eliminate it because even sovereign governments sometimes go bankrupt. So, the risk of 
the loan and, consequently, the rate of interest charged for that loan are reduced as a 
consequence of the guarantee. But the lower rate results in lower revenue. Therefore, the 
benefit from the guarantee is counterbalanced by less revenue. 
 
A numerical example can illustrate this point. What matters to a lender is the expected return 
on the loan it grants. If the borrower is risky, the lender will charge a higher rate of interest. 
Suppose that the market rate of interest for the most credit worthy borrower is 3%. Usually, 
this is the rate at which capital markets lend sovereign governments. If a bank provides a loan 
to a company, it forgoes the interest of 3% that it would have earned by investing in 
government bonds. So the bank must charge at least the opportunity cost of the loan which is 
3%. But the loan to a company bears additional risk. This translates into additional costs that 
have to be included in the interest rate. This additional risk is the expected cost from default. If 
a borrower represents an additional risk of 5% (the extra probability of default), the rate that 
will be charged by a bank on a loan to that particular borrower would be at least 8% (assuming 
no other costs such as the administration of the loan and the credit assessment of the 
borrower). This is because the expected cost of the loan for the bank is 8%. If another bank or 
a public authority offers to guarantee that the borrower will repay the whole loan (which 
means that in case of default of the borrower it will have to repay the loan itself), the 
additional risk is removed. In the end, the lender is indifferent between charging a higher 
interest rate without guarantee or a lower interest rate with a guarantee. The borrower, of 
course, is not indifferent. A free guarantee lowers the cost of the loan. 
 
However, the lender too can benefit from a guarantee if it is granted after the loan is provided. 
If after obtaining a loan, a borrower encounters difficulties in repaying that loan and in 
response the state grants a free guarantee, then both the borrower and the lender become 
better off from state aid. The borrower does not have to pay a market rate of premium while 
the lender also benefits because the probability that the loan becomes non-performing is 
reduced or even eliminated. 
 
The fact that normally it is the borrower who benefits from guarantees has also been 
established in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In a recent case, the 
Court adopted the opinion of the Advocate-General Juliane Kokott who examined in depth the 
issue of who benefits from state guarantees.22 She found that also the lender obtained a 
benefit because the public guarantee secured a non-performing loan. The case concerned the 
granting of a guarantee by the Municipality of Rotterdam to a company called RDM Aerospace 
to enable it to convert old debt into a new loan. The lender was a company called Residex 
Capital which was also the creditor in the first place. When the borrower was unable to repay 
the new loan, Residex turned to the Municipality and asked it to honour the guarantee. The 
                                                 
22
 See case C-275/10, Residex Capital v Gemeente Rotterdam. 
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Municipality refused to do so, alleging that the guarantee had been granted contrary to EU law 
on state aid since the aid had not been notified for approval by the Commission and therefore 
it was null and void. 
 
The Court made the following observations: 
“39 In the case where the loan granted by a credit institution to a borrower is guaranteed by 
the public authorities of a Member State, that borrower normally obtains a financial advantage 
and thus benefits from aid within the meaning of Article (107(1) TFEU), inasmuch as the 
financial cost that it bears is less than that which it would have borne if it had had to obtain 
that same financing and that same guarantee at market prices. 
40 However, (…) Residex would also have been liable to procure an economic advantage from 
the guarantee in question. 
41 (…) the financial situation of Aerospace was such that it would not have been able to obtain 
a loan on the capital markets. As a result, it was only by means of the guarantee provided by 
the Gemeente Rotterdam that Residex granted Aerospace a loan at a rate that was 
preferential in comparison with that in force on the market. Furthermore, it is not apparent 
from the documents before the Court that Residex paid the Gemeente Rotterdam under 
normal market conditions in consideration for the benefit that it was deemed to draw from 
the guarantee.  
42 In those circumstances (…) it cannot be excluded at the outset that the guarantee in 
question was granted for the needs of an existing claim of Residex, in the context of a 
restructuring of Aerospace’s debt. If that were so, Residex would have obtained its own 
economic advantage by means of that guarantee since (…) the security of its claim increased as 
a result of being guaranteed by the public authority, with no amendment, moreover, to the 
conditions of the guaranteed loan.” 
 
The AG explained in more detail in her opinion how the lender, Residex, benefited from the 
guarantee: 
“74 (…) at the time when the municipal guarantee was given, Residex was owed a debt of 
millions of euros by Aerospace (…) This debt was converted by Residex into a loan to 
Aerospace, with the guarantee provided by the port authority of Rotterdam playing a 
significant role in the matter. 
75 All of this indicates clearly that the municipal guarantee in this case was given to secure ex 
post a debt already entered into or in the course of a debt restructuring process, which would 
mean that Residex procured an economic advantage of its own from the municipal guarantee 
within the meaning of the law on State aid. Furthermore, there is no indication that Residex 
had paid the Municipality of Rotterdam a normal market commission for the guarantee in 
exchange for its advantage under the guarantee. Hence, both Aerospace and Residex would 
have to be considered beneficiaries of the aid.” 
 
In a very recent decision concerning a state guarantee to Greek company United Textiles, the 
Commission found that the lending bank, National Bank of Greece, obtained no advantage 
because the guarantee was given ex ante for a new loan. The Commission commented that 
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had the guarantee been granted ex post without any adjustment to the terms of the loan, then 
there could also have been aid to the lender.23 This confirms that the Commission does not 
consider that an ex post guarantee necessarily confers an advantage to the lender. An 
appropriate adjustment to the terms of the loan may offset any such advantage. There 
appears, however, that the Commission has yet to deal with such a case. 
 
II.2. Public loans 
 
This section explains how the gross grant equivalent of state aid in loans can be calculated. The 
loans that fall within the scope of this paper are those which are granted by public authorities 
to undertakings or those that use state resources in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. As we 
will see from the cases reviewed in this section, the calculation can be very complex. 
 
A loan which is granted on market terms does not contain state aid. A loan is deemed to be 
granted on market terms when the rate of interest reflects the credit rating of the borrower 
and the loan is secured with adequate collateral. If the interest rate charged is lower than the 
market rate or the so-called “reference rate” which is used as proxy of the market rate (see 
below) or if the collateral is insufficient, there is state aid in the loan. 
 
This is because the state forgoes revenue which is prima facie selective (because it is given to a 
particular undertaking) and confers an advantage (because it relieves that undertaking from 
part or all of the interest it would otherwise pay). As is well known, a public measure 
constitutes state aid only when all the conditions in Article 107(1) are satisfied. That is, in 
addition to transfer of state resources, selectivity and advantage, there must also be 
affectation of trade and distortion of competition. Since the objective of this paper is to 
examine solely how the existence of advantage is established, the other conditions in Article 
107(1) are ignored. 
 
The Commission Communication on Reference and Discounts Rates of 19/1/2008 explains that 
the gross grant equivalent of the state aid in a low-interest loan is the difference between the 
rate charged and the market rate that should have been charged multiplied by the amount of 
the principal and discounted to the point in time that the loan is granted.24 See Annex II.1 for 
numerical examples of how to calculate the gross grant equivalent of state aid. 
 
One complication is that loans may contain grace periods; i.e. periods during which the 
borrower is relieved from the contractual obligation to pay interest and/or re-pay part or the 
entire principal. Even in this case, however, a loan is free of state aid only when the total 
amount of interest that is eventually paid takes into account the amount of interest/principal 
not paid during the grace period. The longer the grace period, the larger the amount of 
interest that will eventually have to be paid by the borrower to the lender. 
                                                 
23
 See Commission Decision 2012/541 on state aid granted to United Textiles. 
24
 Official Journal C 14, 19/1/2008, p.6. 
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II.2.1. Reference rate 
The most important element in the calculation of the amount of state aid in a loan is the 
interest rate that is deemed to correspond to market conditions. The reference rate is a proxy 
for the market rate of interest and can be used in absence of corresponding market rates. The 
use of reference rates, calculated as indicated below, ensures that loans do not contain state 
aid. 
 
The methodology used by the Commission to determine the appropriate reference rate is as 
follows. The reference rate is the sum of a base rate and a risk margin. The latter depends on 
the credit rating and the quality of collateral offered by the borrower.  
 
The base rate is the one-year IBOR. The risk margin varies from 60 to 1000 basis points. For 
instance, for a borrower with good rating (i.e. BBB) and normal collateral, the margin is 100 
basis points. This means that the reference rate for such a borrower is the one-year IBOR plus 
1%. 
 
It is possible to use a fixed rate for a multi-year loan. However, it is not possible to use a fixed 
rate for different borrowers because rates have to be determined individually on the basis of 
the credit rating and collateral that can be offered by each borrower. By contrast, as will be 
seen in the next section that deals with public guarantees, it is possible to use a fixed rate of 
guarantee for different borrowers, provided a guarantee scheme is established according to 
the rules laid down in the Guarantee Notice. 
 
A loan is free of state aid when the interest rate is the market rate or an appropriate reference 
rate calculated as explained above; i.e. adequately reflecting the credit rating of the borrower 
and the quality of the collateral. The market/reference rate can be changed during the life of 
the loan according to terms set in advance. 
 
On the contrary, a loan includes state aid when the interest rate is lower than the relevant 
market/reference rate or the borrower is unable to offer collateral of sufficient quality. The 
amount of state aid is the difference between the rate charged and the appropriate market or 
reference rate, multiplied by the principal of the loan and discounted to the date of granting of 
the aid. The discount rate must be set as explained immediately below. 
 
In its Decision 2012/268 concerning the German Wine Marketing Company (GfW), the 
Commission concluded that a public loan to GfW contained state aid because the rate of 
interest that was charged was lower than the market rate plus the risk premium that should 
have been charged. The reference rate for Germany at the time was higher than the actual 
interest rate of the loan. 
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II.2.2.  Discount rate 
The discount rate is used to calculate net present values; i.e. to discount future streams of 
revenue or expenditure. This rate is determined and adjusted periodically by the Commission 
and is the one-year IBOR plus 100 basis points. 
 
II.2.3. Debt-for-equity swap 
In a recent case concerning aid implemented by Italy for a company called Legler, the 
Commission had to consider how to calculate the amount of state aid in a debt-for-equity 
swap.25 
 
The case was complicated by two factors. First, Legler was a company in difficulty in the 
meaning of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. Second, the public authority which 
injected the capital into Legler had initially accepted to buy debt owed by Legler to another 
company (the creditor) which happened to be in liquidation. Legler owed EUR 17 million to the 
creditor while the public authority paid the creditor only EUR 450,000 which was the 
estimated market value of the debt. After the purchase of the debt, the public authority 
converted EUR 14.5 million of the debt into equity. 
 
The creditor obtained no advantage because it sold a claim with nominal value of EUR 17 
million for the price of EUR 450,000 which even though it was a much smaller amount it was 
equivalent to the market value of that claim. The question was whether the conversion of EUR 
14.5 million of debt into equity constituted state aid to Legler. The conversion could contain 
state aid because it relieved Legler from the burden of servicing that portion of its debt. Given 
the dire financial situation of Legler, the Commission concluded that no private investor would 
accept to inject capital in the company by converting old debt into new equity. 
 
The fact that the transaction constituted state aid rather than an investment decision was 
shown by the absence of any prior assessment of the prospects of future profitability of Legler. 
Italy could not prove that the investment was a better option than the liquidation of Legler. 
 
The next task for the Commission was to quantify the amount of aid. The amount of aid was 
calculated as follows. The converted amount of debt to equity was equal to 85.3% of the total 
debt (= 14.5 million / 17 million). That ratio corresponded to EUR 383,850 of the value of the 
debt (= 0.853 x 450,000). The derived amount was the GGE of the state aid granted by Italy to 
Legler. It is interesting to note that the nominal value in accounting terms of the debt initially 
acquired by the public authority was irrelevant because it exceeded by far its actual market 
value. 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Commission Decision 2012/51. 
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II.2.4. Examples of public loans that do not contain state aid 
i. Loan to Polish CRIST shipyard:26 The loan was granted by IDA, the Polish industrial 
development agency. The rate of interest was 6.81%, while CRIST was assessed by IDA to be of 
moderate risk (BB) and the value of the collateral it offered was accepted as “high”. At the 
time of the granting of the loan, the three-month inter-bank rate in Poland was 3.81%. IDA 
derived a base rate of 5.1% which was the sum of 3.81% and a margin of 1.2%. The risk 
premium for CRIST was estimated at 1.8%. Therefore, IDA charged interest at 6.81% [= 5.1 + 
1.8]. The Commission’s reference rate for Poland was 4.49%. Although the Commission 
thought that it was possible that the collateral could also have been classified as “moderate” 
or “normal”, implying a risk premium of 2.20%, it accepted the Polish rate of 6.81% because it 
was higher than the rate of 6.69% [= 4.49 + 2.20] that would have applied had the collateral 
offered by CRIST been indeed moderate or normal. Poland also submitted expert valuations of 
the credit rating of CRIST and valuations of the real estate that was used to mortgage the loan. 
The Commission concluded that the Polish government acted as a private investor and the 
loan contained no state aid. 
 
ii. Loan to Czech airlines CSA:27 What makes this case unusual is that the loan was granted by a 
state-owned company that was in liquidation. The Commission established that the state had 
intervened in the liquidation process to make available part of the proceeds as a loan to CSA. 
Therefore, the loan was considered to be transfer of state resources. The interest rate charged 
was 5.51% and was derived by adding a risk premium of 3% point to the three-month inter-
bank rate that was at the time 2.51%. Although the credit rating of CSA was “B” (vulnerable 
financial situation), the level of collateralisation of the loan was 110 % of the loan amount. The 
collateral used to secure the loan-comprised buildings located at Prague airport, land, 
inventories and spare parts. The market value of most of the collateral was established by an 
independent expert. At about the same time, CSA obtained another loan from a commercial 
bank with 5.10% rate of interest. The Commission Communication on Reference Rates 
assumes that “high” collateralisation implies a loss given default below or equal to 30%, which 
corresponds to a value of the collateral of at least 70% of the loan amount. In this case the 
value of the collateral was 110% of the value of the loan. The Commission, therefore, 
concluded that the Czech government acted as a private investor and the loan contained no 
state aid. 
 
II.3. Compatibility of state aid in the form of loans 
The decisional practice of the European Commission has revealed that an important aspect of 
the Commission Communication on Reference and Discounts rates of 19/1/2008 can be 
misunderstood. In a recent decision, SA.31690, concerning subordinated loans in Sachsen-
                                                 
26
 Commission Decision SA.33114 on Polish loan to CRIST Shipyard. 
27
 Commission Decision 2012/637 on Czech loan to CSA airlines. 
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Anhalt, the Commission examined a scheme whereby public loans would be offered to SMEs 
with a low credit rating but without collateral. So in case of default, the loans would be 
subordinated to the claims of other creditors. The German authorities proposed to add an 
appropriate risk premium on top of the four percentage points for companies with satisfactory 
rating (BB) but low-quality collateral. This is the risk premium that, according to the 
Communication, has to be added to the reference rate. 
 
The Commission did not accept that this method would eliminate advantage for the 
borrowers. This is because the Communication regards the rates established on the basis of its 
methodology only as proxies for the market interest rate. The Commission argued that the 
public authority that was lending the money had a mission to make funding available to 
companies which could not obtain loans at all. Therefore, the Commission took into account 
that information and disregarded the rate calculated according to the Communication. It 
concluded that the loans contained state aid but authorised the scheme on condition that the 
amount of aid would not exceed the de minimis threshold of EUR 200,000. 
 
If a loan that contains state aid is granted to an undertaking with no obligation on the part of 
the borrower, it is operating aid. It then has to be appraised according to the rules on 
operating aid. As is well known, operating aid is normally not allowed because it lacks an 
incentive effect. In principle it distorts competition without being able to achieve any of the 
aims of the various derogations allowed by the Treaty.28 
 
Operating aid, therefore, is only exceptionally permitted.29 Operating aid in the form of 
subsidised loans is only possible when operating is allowed by current state air rules such as, 
for example, the Regional Aid Guidelines for Article 107(3)(a) areas. Loans are also possible 
under certain conditions on the basis of the Guidelines for Risk Capital to SMEs. But these 
Guidelines require that funding to SMEs is provided at commercial terms. For the sake of 
completeness, operating aid is also possible under the Environmental Aid Guidelines and the 
Guidelines on Aid to Maritime Transport, but it is unlikely that loans would be the right 
instrument because in both cases the aid that can be allowed is in the form of tax exemptions 
(from environmental taxes and from personal income taxes, respectively). 
 
Of course, the de minimis facility may also be used. The Regulation 1998/2006 on De Minimis 
Aid does not impose any limitation on form or use of de minimis aid, apart from stipulating 
that it may not promote exports or the use of domestic products. Therefore, aid in the form of 
interest subsidies is possible, as long as the total amount of the aid per undertaking, not just 
per loan, does not exceed EUR 200,000 over a period of three fiscal years and all the other 
conditions of the Regulation are satisfied. 
 
Unless operating aid satisfies the restrictive conditions of the rules mentioned above, it is 
incompatible with the internal market. If such operating aid has already been granted illegally 
                                                 
28
 See T-211/05, Italy v Commission; T-348/04, SIDE v Commission. 
29
 See T-211/05, Italy v Commission. 
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(i.e. without prior notification to the Commission) it must be recovered. In Commission 
Decision 2012/268 concerning the German Wine Marketing Company (GfW), the Commission 
also had to assess the compatibility of the aid. It concluded that the aid was not compatible 
with any of the state aid regulations and guidelines. It also found that the aid could not be 
exempted directly on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) because the aid merely improved the 
financial situation of GfW without contributing to the development of an economic activity. In 
the end the aid was incompatible, but the Commission did not order recovery because in the 
meantime GfW went bankrupt and the purchaser of its assets acquired them at market prices. 
This implied that there was no aid to the purchaser. The Commission also examined whether 
any aid had leaked to wine producers from whom GfW had bought wine but again concluded 
that they had not benefited from aid because GfW had paid the going market price. 
 
Another interesting aspect of this case is that some time after GfW received the loan it ran into 
financial trouble and could not repay the loan in full – even at the subsidised interest rate. The 
public body which had granted the loan then wrote off part of it to make it easier for GfW to 
repay it. The Commission, therefore, also examined, on the basis of the public creditor 
principle, whether the write off included aid. It identified the following two options for that 
public body: either i) to force GfW into liquidation, or ii) write off part of the loan and allow 
GfW to continue operating so that it would have a better prospect of repaying the remaining 
loan. The eventual choice between these two options depended on the amount of money that 
was expected to be generated by each one of them, which in turn depended on, the one hand, 
whether the loan was secured against collateral and, on the other, the business prospects 
from continued operations. The Commission was satisfied from the information submitted by 
Germany that the write off would generate more money in the end because the loan was not 
secured and the lender could receive only an uncertain amount of revenue from sale of assets 
after all other creditors were paid. 
 
In order to remove a subsidised public loan from the realm of operating aid, the loan has to be 
given on condition that the borrower commits to make an investment, hire staff, carry out 
R&D or undertake an activity that is eligible to receive state aid under any of the Guidelines on 
state aid or the General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER).30 
 
For example, in case N 5/2010, the Commission approved state aid granted by Spanish 
authorities in the form of a 15-year, interest-free loan without collateral and with a five-year 
grace period. The reference rate was 3.65%, made up of a base rate of 1.45% and a margin of 
2.20%. The discount rate was 2.45% (base rate plus 1.00%). The loan was intended to enable 
the borrower to carry out research. Therefore the compatibility of the aid included in the loan 
was assessed and eventually approved by the Commission on the basis of the R&D&I 
Framework. 
 
In a rare case, the Commission approved a German scheme for subsidised loans to SMEs 
directly on the basis of Article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty (see Commission Decision on case 
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 Regulation 800/2008. 
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SA.30015). Aid for investment in SMEs is allowed under the GBER. The maximum permissible 
aid intensity is 10% for medium-sized enterprises and 20% for small enterprises. 
 
In case SA.30015, Germany could not use the GBER because Article 5 of the GBER stipulates 
that only transparent aid can be exempted. In order to be transparent, aid that is included in 
subsidised loans has to be calculated on the basis of the methodology in the Commission 
Communication on Reference and Discount Rates. The German scheme used a methodology 
that deviated from that of the Commission. 
 
According to the German methodology, in order to calculate the aid amount, the market rate 
of interest was to be determined as follows. The base rate of the loans was the 10-year swap 
rate because the loans were to be granted for 10 years. On top of that rate, a risk margin was 
added which was equivalent to the risk of the default reduced by the proportion of the loans 
that could be recovered. Using information on the performance of more than 200,000 past 
loans, the German authorities calculated that a risk margin of 2.4%-2.7% had to be added to 
the base rate. 
 
The German authorities also calculated a hypothetical cost of capital of 1% that was to be 
considered the required capital remuneration. This was derived from a capital base of 8% of 
the total amount of loans and a rate of return of 12.5% (i.e. 0.125 x 0.08 = 0.01). An 
administrative cost of 0.5%-0.8% was also added to bring the total margin to 3.9%-4.5%. For 
reasons of certainty, the German authorities chose the high end of 4.5%. 
Since the aid was granted on conditions that otherwise were identical to those of the GBER, 
the Commission had little difficulty to conclude that the aid could be declared compatible with 
the internal market. Moreover, the German authorities proposed to grant aid to cover 
operating costs such as spare parts. Such aid was to be made available in conformity with the 
requirements of the De minimis Regulation 1998/06. 
 
II.4. State guarantees 
 
The Commission Notice of 20/6/2008 on Guarantees explains under which conditions a 
guarantee contains state aid or not and how the state aid element can be calculated.31 
According to this Notice, an individual guarantee granted by a public authority is deemed not 
to involve state aid when the following four cumulative conditions apply: 
1. The borrower is not in financial difficulty. 
2. The guarantee is linked to a specific transaction and it is limited in time and amount. 
3. The guaranteed amount is less than 80% of the nominal amount of the underlying loan 
(there is no limitation concerning the ratio of the loan to the cost or value of the project or the 
size of the borrower). 
                                                 
31
 Official Journal C 155 of 20/6/2008, p. 10. 
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4. A market price is paid, depending on the assessed risk in each individual case. Risk depends 
on the credit rating of the borrower, the quality of collateral, if any, and the amount that can 
be recovered in case of default. 
 
In the case of SMEs, the Commission accepts the use of safe-harbour annual premiums defined 
in the Notice to presume the absence of state aid. These premiums vary from 0.4% to 6.3%, 
depending on the credit rating of the borrower which varies  from AAA to B-, respectively. 
 
If any of the above conditions do not hold, then the guarantee is presumed to contain state 
aid. This is because the authority that grants the guarantee assumes a certain amount of risk. 
Even if a guarantee is never called, the potential liabilities of that authority increase without a 
compensatory increase in its revenue. As established in the case law, any advantage granted 
by means of an additional potential burden for the state is liable to amount to state aid.32 
 
The Court of Justice has ruled that to determine whether a guarantee contains state aid it is 
necessary to consider how a private investor would behave (Stardust Marine, C-482/99). In 
principle, a private investor that offers a guarantee would always charge a premium, P, that is 
at least equal and preferably exceeds the expected cost, C, of the guarantee. The expected 
cost is, at minimum, equivalent to the amount that is guaranteed, A, multiplied by the 
probability of default, B. In other words, P ≥ C = (A x B). If the investor also incurs 
administrative costs, D, then those costs must be added to the premium and the formula 
becomes P ≥ C = (A x B) + D. 
 
For example, if i) a public authority guarantees a loan of EUR 1 million, ii) the loan has to be re-
paid at the end of the year, iii) the probability of default during that period is, say, 5%, iv) it 
incurs administrative costs of EUR 5,000 and v) in case default occurs the borrower has no 
assets to compensate the lender, then the expected cost to that authority is EUR 55,000 (= 
(EUR 1 million x 0.05) + EUR 5,000). If the authority is not to experience an uncompensated 
increase in its liabilities, the premium it should charge must be at least as high as EUR 55,000. 
 
It follows that the amount of state aid in a guarantee is the difference between the net present 
value of the appropriate premium that would be charged by a private investor and the 
premium actually charged or S = Pm – Pa, where S is the amount of state aid, Pm is the market 
premium and Pa is the actual premium. Using the example above, if the public authority 
charges a premium of 1%, the amount of state aid is 45, 000 (= S = 55,000 – 10,000). The aid 
intensity is 4.5% (= 45,000/1,000,000). 
 
For multi-year guarantees, the amount of state aid is the sum of discounted values of future 
premiums on the outstanding amounts of the underlying loan which is guaranteed at the 
beginning of each year. 
 
                                                 
32
 See, C-200/97, Ecotrade; T-204/97, EPAC v Commission, T-204/97. 
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The Notice on Guarantees also defines conditions that establish a presumption that state aid is 
absent in guarantee schemes. A scheme in this context is a financial instrument that provides 
for multiple guarantees on a self-sustained basis. That is, the scheme covers its own costs of 
operation. These conditions are: 
1. Borrowers must not be in financial difficulty. 
2. Guarantees are granted for specific transactions and are limited in time and amount. 
3. Guarantees do not exceed 80% of the underlying loans. This condition does not apply to 
services of general economic interest (SGEI) where public service obligations are imposed 
by the public authorities that offer the guarantees and the sole activity of the borrowers is 
the provision of the services in question. 
4. The scheme is self-financed by premiums. 
5. Premiums are reviewed and adjusted at least once per year. 
6. Premiums must cover normal risk (i.e. default rate) plus administrative costs plus the 
remuneration of capital, even if there is no separate capital to finance guarantees. The 
required capital is presumed to be at least 8% of the amount of guarantees, while the risk 
premium for equity, which is the required rate of remuneration, is presumed to be 4%. 
Therefore, the remuneration of the capital invested to be considered for the purpose of 
calculating the gross grant equivalent for guarantees issued within the scheme is 0.32% 
(8% x 4%). 
In case the borrower has no credit rating or history or cannot offer any collateral, the risk 
premium that should be charged must be at least 3.8%. 
 
If any of the above conditions is not satisfied the Commission will open the formal 
investigation procedure. This indeed happened in case C 7/2008 concerning a guarantee 
scheme for working capital loans in Saxony. The German authorities were proposing to offer 
guarantees of up to EUR 10 million and 80% of the loan, levy a fixed annual premium of just 
0.5% of the outstanding guaranteed amount, and charge an one-off administrative fee of 0.5% 
of the initial amount, up to a maximum of EUR 15,000. 
 
The Commission thought that the premium was possibly too low and doubted that the scheme 
was self-financing. In the end the notification was withdrawn before the conclusion of the 
investigation. 
 
By contrast in case SA.31261 concerning a municipal guarantee for a loan for geothermal heat 
distribution in Germany, the Commission concluded that the guarantee contained no state aid 
because the German authorities were able to provide a letter from a bank which was willing to 
offer a guarantee for that loan. The Commission accepted that the premium quoted by the 
bank was a proper market benchmark and since it was equal to the premium charged by the 
municipality in question, the state guarantee conferred no advantage to the borrower and 
therefore contained no state aid. 
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II.4.1. Methodologies 
The most important aspect of a measure involving guarantees is to establish a methodology 
for calculating an appropriate premium. This applies to both individual guarantees and 
guarantee schemes. 
 
With respect to individual guarantees, in case N 197/2007, the Commission approved a 
methodology for calculating the state aid element in guarantees provided in Germany. The 
German authorities intended to offer guarantees to enterprises of all sizes, not just SMEs. 
Therefore, they needed to notify their methodology. The aid would be granted for regional 
development purposes. Germany proposed to calculate a proxy for the market rate as follows. 
A basic premium rate was established according to the probability of default based on historic 
data. The average one-year probability of default was 2%. This rate was increased in the case 
of multi-year loans because the probability of default would rise as well. As a consequence, the 
average of one year increased from 2% to 8.9% for 8 years. This adjusted probability was then 
reduced by the average percentage of recovered assets, which was 20%. Lastly, a margin of 
0.25% to 2.5% was added to reflect administrative costs, depending on the complexity of each 
case.  
 
With respect to guarantee schemes, a good example of how they should be designed is given 
by the Austrian case N 179/2008 (it is also worth seeing case N 185/2008 which uses a slightly 
more elaborated methodology, also notified by Austria). 
 
The Austrian measure concerned a methodology for calculating the aid element of guarantees 
granted to undertakings in a specific sector, namely tourism. The methodology established a 
hypothetical market premium and compared it to the premium actually charged to establish 
the grant equivalent of the guarantee. The hypothetical market premium was determined on 
the basis of the following elements: the probability of default, the expected rate of asset 
recovery, administrative costs relating to risk assessment, risk monitoring and risk 
management and the remuneration of adequate capital.  
 
The probability of default was established for each beneficiary of the guarantee (i.e. the 
borrower) with the help of a rating system that was based on financial data of enterprises in 
the tourism sector which had been financially successful and those which had been insolvent. 
According to that data, the risk of default on a guarantee rose in the first two years from 15% 
to 25%, and then fell again from the fourth year to 10% while no defaulting was observed from 
the sixth year onwards. 
 
When a default occurs and the guarantee is called, the loss to the guarantor usually does not 
amount to the full amount of the guarantee. This is because the loss for the guarantor is 
reduced through seizing and selling the securities which were given as collateral. Such 
collaterals are (i) material security (mortgages) and (ii) personal security (personal assumption 
of liability, assumption of debt). The Austrian methodology took into account the recovery 
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rates for these types of collateral, which were calculated on the basis of historical data. The 
calculated recovery rate varied from 0% to 35%. 
 
An administration cost rate of 0.39% (in relation to the total outstanding guarantee amount) 
was calculated on the basis of the total hourly wages incurred in administering guarantees. 
 
As regards the fictional remuneration of capital, a risk premium of 400 basis points was 
considered. The assumed underlying amount of the capital to be remunerated was taken to be 
8% of the outstanding guarantee amount. 
 
Taking all these factors into account, the formula approved by the Commission for determining 
the market premium was: 
P (premium) = L (expected loss) + A (administrative costs) + C (remuneration of capital) 
 
The expected loss was the outstanding guarantee at the beginning of each year multiplied by 
the probability of default for the given year and then multiplied by 1 minus the recovery rate; 
i.e. L = G (amount guaranteed) x PD (probability of default) x (1 – R) (1 – recovery rate). 
 
The amount of gross grant equivalent of state aid was the difference between the market rate 
of premium and the actual rate of premium charged. For multiple-year guarantees, the grant 
equivalent was discounted to the moment of granting the guarantees using the applicable 
reference rate for Austria for discounting. 
 
In case N 182/2010 Italy proposed a method to determine the aid element in guarantees for 
SMEs. This method was to be used to calculate both de minimis aid and the aid element in 
working capital loans. The method established a theoretical market premium and compared it 
with the premium actually charged to establish the grant equivalent of the guarantee. The 
theoretical market premium was determined so that it covered the probability of losses net of 
recovery, the (adequate) remuneration of capital and administrative costs. 
 
The gross grant equivalent was the aggregated amount of the yearly differences between this 
theoretical market premium and the actually paid premium that were discounted to the date 
of granting the guarantee. 
 
The theoretical market premium of the guarantee was determined as follows: 
I = D x Z x (FR + C + R), where 
I = theoretical market premium of the guarantee; 
D = amount of outstanding loan assisted by the guarantee; 
Z = percentage of outstanding loan D covered by the guarantee; 
FR = risk factor of the scheme (percentage value); 
C = administrative costs (percentage value); 
R = remuneration of public resources invested under the guarantee scheme (percentage 
value). 
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Consequently, in case of a guarantee with duration of less than one year, the gross grant 
equivalent (GGE) of the guarantees provided by schemes applying the notified methodology 
was: 
GGE = D x Z x ((FR + C + R) – G), where 
G = premium actually paid by the beneficiary for admission to the guarantee 
scheme (in percentage terms). 
 
In case of a guarantee duration exceeding 12 months, the differences between the theoretical 
market premium and the premium actually paid at the end of each period were discounted to 
their present value using the Commission reference rate. In this case, the gross grant 
equivalent was: 
GGE = Σ(It – Gt)(1t+i)
-t, where 
i = reference rate. 
It = theoretical yearly market premium of the guarantee for the year t, determined according 
to the first formula, where D is the outstanding debt at year t of the guaranteed loan, 
calculated conventionally by supposing an amortization rate with annual instalments 
consistent with rate I; 
Gt = yearly premium actually paid by the beneficiary for admission to the guarantee scheme at 
year t. 
 
Finally, if the duration of a guarantee exceeded 12 months, but the actual premium required 
for the guarantee was paid by the applicant as a one-off sum at the time the guarantee was 
granted, then the formula to be applied for determining the GGE was: 
GGE = (ΣIt(1 + i)
-t) – Pu, where 
Pu = (D x Z x G) = one-off premium paid at the time the guarantee was granted. 
 
A different approach was followed in case N201/b/2007 concerning a methodology for a 
guarantee scheme in Hungary. According to the methodology adopted by the Hungarian 
authorities, the starting point was the amount of annual revenue from guarantee premiums 
that was needed to ensure a certain level of after-tax profit on equity employed. The formula 
that was notified was as follows: 
R (revenue from premiums) + I (investment income) = P (profit) + E (expenses) + L (losses 
minus recovery) or R = P + E + L – I 
where P = (amount of equity x bank base rate)/(1 – tax rate). 
Premiums were then calculated according to the probability of default. The derived amount of 
state aid was the difference between the market premium as determined by the formula 
above and the premium actually charged. 
 
In case SA.33022 Denmark notified a methodology for calculating a transparent amount of 
state aid in guarantees covering loans aimed at financing expansion of business. The 
guarantees cover 75% of loan up to DKK 10 million (EUR 1.33 million) and 65% of a loan 
between DKK 10 million and DKK 25 million (EUR 3.35 million). 
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The calculation methodology uses a single premium and a single risk factor irrespective of the 
risk class of borrowing SMEs. The aid element is the difference between the theoretical market 
premium and the premium actually paid. The basis for the theoretical premium is the 
guaranteed sum multiplied by the risk factor. This basic premium is reduced by the proportion 
of expected recovered assets and then increased by a consideration for adequate 
remuneration of capital and administrative costs. More specifically, the individual items in the 
formula used by the Danish authorities are as follows: 
V: The total loan volume amounts to DKK 1438 million (EUR 192 million). The total loan volume 
is estimated based on capital demands in the market and the availability of guarantees. 
G: The total guarantee volume amounts to DKK 1037 million (EUR 138 million) and is estimated 
on the basis of the total loan amount multiplied by the guarantee percentages (i.e. 75 % & 65 
%). That is, DKK 1438 million x 0.72 = DKK 1037 million under the assumption that the average 
loan amounts to DKK 14 million (EUR 1.86 million). 
D: The expected default rate of 12% is an estimate based on historic numbers and forward 
looking projections, and takes into account expected recoveries. 
P: Premiums actually paid by the borrower include 2% fee charged on the guaranteed amount 
plus the borrower will pay a yearly premium of 1.25% of the depreciated guarantee amount. 
R: The expected revenue from premiums is DKK 80 million (EUR 11 million) with a view that 
the premiums actually paid by the borrowers can secure that the long term total costs of the 
scheme are fully covered by the premiums. 
A: The administrative costs are set at DKK 11 million (EUR 1.5 million), which corresponds to 
1.06 % of the total value of the guarantee scheme. 
F: The loan default payments amount to DKK 125 million (EUR 17 million), i.e.: the expected 
loss rate of 12% is multiplied by the total amount of the guarantees to be issued of DKK 1037 
million (DKK 1037 million x 0.12 = DKK 125 million). All payments on loan defaults include 
expected recoveries. 
K: The capital return amounts to DKK 27 million (EUR 4 million). The capital yield is based on a 
risk premium of 4% per annum of an amount equal to 8% of the granted guarantees (as 
indicated in Guarantee Notice). It is derived as follows: DKK 27 million = DKK 1037 million x 
0.08 x 0.04 x 8 years). 
 
The above can be summarized as follows: 
Loans covered by guarantees    DKK 1438 million 
Total guarantee undertakings    DKK 1037 million 
Expected default rate (over lifetime of guarantees) 12% 
Expected income from premiums, current value DKK 80 million 
 
Costs: 
Administrative costs     DKK 11 million 
Payments on defaulting guarantees   DKK 125 million 
Capital return      DKK 27 million 
Total costs      DKK 162 million 
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The market premium is calculated as follows. The total cost of DKK 162 millions is divided by 
total guarantee amount of DKK 1037 million, which is 0.1562 or 15.6%. This is the total 
required market rate for a guarantee for the loan of the average amount of DKK 14 million and 
the average duration of 8 years. The yearly market premium equals to 3.5% of the outstanding 
guarantee amount for a given year. 
 
The rate of aid intensity is derived as follows. First, the annual amount of state aid is calculated 
as the difference between the market premium of 3.5% and the rate of 1.25% that will be 
actually charged. The amount of aid for each of the 8 years is then discounted and summed up. 
This discounted sum, which is DKK 733287, is expressed as a percentage in relation to the 
outstanding guaranteed amount of the average loan of DKK 14 million in the first year. That is, 
733,287/10,100,000 = 7.26% 
 
Finally, a scheme developed by the Netherlands should also be mentioned here because the 
Commission conclusion was that it contained no state aid. The measure was approved in 
decision N 639/2009 and later modified and approved in decision SA.33051. Only the original 
version is explained here because the modification has not change the substance of the 
measure. 
 
The guarantee covers up to 80% of the loan on a pari passu basis for shipbuilding projects. The 
underlying loans are issued for up to 100% of the cost of constructing a ship. Collateral is the 
ship itself. Recovery of losses can be up to 80% of the value of the ships when sold. The fees 
for guarantees are set at a level that cover the costs (estimated ex ante) of the guarantee 
scheme. Moreover, the fee paid by shipyards for a guarantee is the higher of (i) a fee based 
upon the shipyard’s rating at the time the guarantee is issued (method 1) and (ii) the fee based 
upon the state’s own assessment (method 2). 
 
Under Method 1 the fee is made of three elements: the normal risk of guarantees (which is 
based upon the shipyard’s ratings and the corresponding probability of default), administrative 
costs and the remuneration of capital. In order to ensure that the measure is self-financing the 
following factors were taken into account: 
The probability of default is drawn from Standard & Poor’s calculations of default for different 
risk classes. 
The loss in case of default was initially estimated to be 75% and later revised to 50%. The latter 
means that in case of default 50% of the guaranteed sum is expected to be recovered so that 
the cost of default is the probability multiplied by 50%. 
For capital costs, 0.8% of the guaranteed amount is charged (10% over 8% of the guaranteed 
amount). 
For administrative costs for each project, 1.0% is charged in the first year, 0.3% for each 
subsequent year. 
The probability of default is assumed to be in accordance with the methodology set out in BIS 
working paper 207. 
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The annual fee is the sum of the various costs: the expected cost of default (= probability of 
default multiplied by 50%) plus capital costs of 0.8% and administrative costs of 1% (first year) 
or 0.3% (second or any subsequent year). 
 
Under Method 2 the projects are assessed on the basis of 13 different criteria developed by 
the state. The 13 criteria are as follows: 
Yard      Ranges 
1. Track record shipyard  -5 to 5 
2. Qualification management   -2 to 2 
3. Liquidity     -3 to 3 
4. Profitability     -3 to 3 
5. Margin on construction project  -5 to 5 
6. Liquidity planning during construction -3 to 3 
7. Exchange rate risk    -2 to 0 
8. Type of ship    -2 to 2 
 
Client 
9. Track record client    -5 to 5 
10. Experience with type of ship  -3 to 3 
 
Supplier 
11. Casco construction   -4 to 4 
12. Duration of construction period  -3 to 3 
13. Pass on of raw material costs to client 0 to 2 
 
The sum of the scores of these 13 criteria, ranging from -40 to 40, is then linked to the annual 
fee which ranges from 0.8% to 4.5%. 
 
 100% guarantees 
According to the Guarantee Notice, the guaranteed amount should not exceed 80% of the 
underlying loan. The only exception is for providers of services of general economic interest 
(“SGEI”) on whom public service obligations (“PSO”) are imposed by the public authority that 
offers the guarantee and the borrower has no economic activity outside the defined SGEI. In 
these cases, the Commission has to examine, in addition to the other conditions laid down in 
the Notice, whether (i) they concern genuine SGEI or PSO, (ii) the guarantee is offered by the 
same authority that imposes the PSO and (iii) the borrower carries out no activity other than 
the SGEI. 
 
In case SA.31261 mentioned above concerning the imposition of a public service obligation to 
supply geothermal energy in Germany, the Commission concluded that all three additional 
requirements were satisfied. 
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Unlimited guarantees33 
The 2008 Notice on Guarantees explains that public guarantees may be linked to the status of 
an undertaking itself and imply coverage of losses by the state. More specifically, there is aid in 
the form of a guarantee where more favourable funding terms are obtained by undertakings 
whose legal form rules out bankruptcy or other insolvency procedures or provides an explicit 
state guarantee or coverage of losses by the state. The fact that there is no explicit contract is 
not relevant. 
 
In the case of La Poste, the Commission in Decision 2010/605 found that French law did 
acknowledge the granting of implied guarantees, and in particular the existence of a state 
guarantee deriving from the status of publicly owned establishment.34 Since the guarantee was 
an essential component of its relationship with the state, La Poste enjoyed more favourable 
borrowing terms that it would have obtained had it been assessed only on its own credit 
worthiness. 
 
When the General Court recently ruled on the appeal lodged by France against Commission 
Decision 2010/605, it reiterated that “an unlimited State guarantee enables its recipient inter 
alia to obtain more favourable credit terms than what it would have obtained on its own 
merits alone and, therefore, eases the pressure on its budget.”35 Consequently, it agreed with 
the Commission that the unlimited guarantee conferred an advantage which constituted state 
aid even though the Commission was not able to quantify the amount of the aid. In other 
words, it was not possible to calculate the amount of the market premium that La Poste should 
have paid to the state. The Court also concurred with the view of the Commission that a 
guaranteed does not have to be granted through an explicit assignment to a particular 
undertaking, but may also be implicitly granted through a broader legal arrangement which 
allows for compensation by the state of the creditors of undertakings a certain legal status. 
 
A similar conclusion was reached by the Commission in its Decision 2005/145 on state aid to 
EDF where the Commission took the view that EDF was not subject to administration or 
compulsory liquidation proceedings, and therefore could not be declared bankrupt. That was 
deemed to be equivalent to a general guarantee covering all its liabilities. That type of 
guarantee could not be the subject of any remuneration according to the rules of the market. 
The guarantee, which was unlimited in scope, time and amount, constituted state aid. 
                                                 
33
 In a rather unusual and unique case, the Commission found that a so-called “indemnification 
guarantee” constituted incompatible state aid. Such a guarantee was granted by the Greek state during 
privatization proceedings to the prospective purchaser of a state-owned shipyard. The purpose of the 
guarantee was to offset fully any liability of the purchaser in relation to any hidden state aid that could 
be detected after the sale and which would be determined by the Commission to be incompatible with 
the internal market. The Commission’s grounds for the finding of incompatibility was that the Greek 
state was seeking to nullify the effectiveness of Article 107(1) TFEU. In a subsequent appeal, the decision 
of the Commission was endorsed by the General Court in case T-384/08, Elliniki Nafpigokataskevastiki v 
European Commission. 
34
 OJ L274, 19/10/2010. 
35
 T-154/10, France v Commission, paragraph 108. 
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In two other related cases the Commission examined unlimited guarantees granted to the 
Institute Francais du Petrole (IFP). IFP carries out research on petroleum products and 
processes and disseminates the results of its research through publications and training. In its 
Decisions 2009/157 & 2012/26, the Commission concluded that IFP was a research 
organisation in the meaning of the R&D&I Framework. Therefore, it did not carry out economic 
activity and any public funding it received, including the unlimited guarantee, was not state 
aid. However, the Commission was concerned about direct aid to the commercial activities of 
IFP and indirect aid to the creditors and clients of IFP. 
 
The Commission found that there was both direct and indirect state aid for the following 
reasons. First, the unlimited guarantee meant that no creditor of IFP could lose its money. 
Therefore, banks would be willing to provide finance at very low rates to IFP. As a result, the 
activities of IFP which were in competition with other undertakings could derive a selective 
advantage. Second, other creditors never faced the prospect of seeking to recover their money 
in case of default because IFP could never default. Third, suppliers of IFP were certain that they 
would always be paid and, as a result, charged lower prices to IFP, which resulted in benefits 
for IFP’s commercial activities outside research. Fourth, clients of IFP would prefer to do 
business with IFP because they would never lose their money. Even if IFP could not complete a 
research project satisfactorily, the client was indemnified. In dealing with other providers of 
similar research services, clients who wanted to obtain the same level of security would have 
to buy a performance bond from a financial intermediary. Not only suppliers and clients 
avoided certain costs, they also obtained an advantage in relation to similar companies doing 
business with enterprises providing services competing with those of IFP. 
 
It is interesting here that the Commission equated the unlimited guarantee to a factoring 
contract with a factoring fee varying between 0.7% and 2.5% of the turnover covered. 
 
In the end the Commission found that state aid was compatible with the internal market 
because it did not exceed what was allowed by the R&D&I Framework. 
 
In all cases, the Commission ordered France to end the unlimited guarantees. These decisions 
followed the precedent established by its treatment of state guarantees for public banks in 
Germany. The difference was that the aid for the German banks was existing and, therefore, 
the Commission had to propose appropriate measures for its abolition without recovery.36 
 
II.4.2. Compatibility of state aid in the form of guarantees 
If a guarantee contains state aid, the same issues as those considered in the case of operating 
aid in loans apply here too. Operating aid is not normally allowed unless it can exceptionally be 
authorised under conditions specified in the relevant Guidelines (e.g. for regional investment 
in Article 107(3)(a) areas). 
                                                 
36
 See case E 10/2000. 
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De minimis Regulation 1998/2006 makes an explicit reference to guarantees. It is possible to 
provide de minimis aid in the form of a guarantee without having first to calculate the gross 
grant equivalent of the aid included in the guarantee. This is permitted only when the aid is 
granted in the framework of a scheme (i.e. no ad-hoc measures), the guaranteed part of the 
loan does not exceed EUR 1.5 million per undertaking and the guaranteed amount does not 
exceed 80% of the underlying loan. 
 
If state aid in a guarantee is not to be regarded as operating aid or de minimis aid, it must be 
linked to an eligible activity and must comply with the GBER or the relevant Guidelines. This is 
also because the Notice on Guarantees does not provide any compatibility criteria of its own. 
 
II.5. Combined loans and guarantees 
A guarantee always enables the borrower to obtain funds at a lower rate of interest. This is 
because the guarantee reduces the risk for the lender. The lower interest represents a gain for 
the borrower which, however, is partly or wholly offset by the premium it has to pay to the 
guarantor. 
 
The gross grant equivalent of the state aid amount is the difference between the market rate 
of interest without the guarantee and the interest rate obtained by means of the state 
guarantee, net of the premium, if any, that has been paid for the guarantee. 
 
The Commission was confronted with this situation in case N 63/2010 concerning a state 
guarantee for the construction of Murcia International Airport in Spain. The Spanish 
government granted a guarantee covering 100% of a EUR 200 million loan. The duration of the 
loan was five years. Since the guarantee covered more than 80% of the underlying loan, there 
could be no presumption that there was no state aid, even if the beneficiary did pay a 
premium. 
 
The Commission’s main problem was to establish the market rate of interest that would have 
applied to SCAM, the airport operator, which was a newly established special purpose vehicle 
without a credit history. Because the rating of SCAM was believed not to be above “weak”, it 
was graded at “B” with “low” collateral. On this basis, the Commission derived the 
corresponding market rate and calculated the amount of aid in the loan. From this amount it 
then subtracted the premium already paid by SCAM and discounted it to obtain the net 
present value of the aid, which came to EUR 26.5 million. 
 
In case N 541/2009 Sweden proposed to grant a state guarantee to Saab Automobile to enable 
it to obtain a EUR 400 million loan from the EIB. The guarantee was divided into two separate 
guarantees. The first guarantee, guarantee A, covered 82.8% of the loan, i.e. EUR 331.2 million. 
Saab would pay a premium amounting to 323 basis points per annum for the first two years, 
i.e. 3.23% of the installments received by Saab. After this period of two years, Saab would pay 
a premium amounting to 380 bps (3.80%) p.a. for the remainder of the validity of the 
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guarantee. The second guarantee, guarantee B, covered the remaining 17.2% of the loan, i.e. 
EUR 68.8 million. For this, Saab would pay a premium of 1248 bps per annum, i.e. 12.48% of 
the amount covered by the guarantee. Sweden argued that guarantee A involved compatible 
state aid, while guarantee B was free of aid. 
 
The problem for the Commission was that it could not identify a corresponding market 
premium for that kind of loan. The Commission determined a plausible market premium using 
values for risk-adjusted return on capital in the automotive sector with evidence concerning 
the quality of the collateral (presumed to be high), a credit rating of Caa, the corresponding 
default rates provided by Moody’s for the Caa category and Moody’s historical series on 
expected recovery rate corresponding to the senior secured ranking of guarantee B. On this 
basis, the Commission accepted that the fee paid for guarantee B was at least as high as the 
margin for a similar non-guaranteed loan, and that guarantee B therefore did not involve state 
aid. 
 
With respect to guarantee A, it was found to be compatible with the internal market because it 
was granted in compliance with the Temporary Framework for State Aid to counter the effects 
of the financial crisis 2008-10. 
 
Occasionally, the credit rating of the borrower is so low or the collateral it can offer is so poor 
that there is no market player willing to either offer a guarantee or a loan. Because the 
borrower cannot secure a guarantee it cannot obtain a loan either. Under these circumstances 
there is state aid in both the guarantee and the underlying loan.37 In this case, the whole 
amount of the loan is the GGE of state aid. 
 
This typically happens when the borrower is a company in difficulty in the meaning of the 
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines. Without outside injection of capital or new loans, the 
company will eventually go bankrupt. In a number of recent decisions the Commission has 
found that the amount of state aid in loans to companies in difficulty corresponds to the 
totality of the guaranteed amount of the loan.38 
 
II.6. Recovery of incompatible aid in loans and guarantees 
If state aid is found to be incompatible with the internal market, Regulation 659/99 obliges the 
European Commission to instruct the Member State concerned to recover the aid and charge 
interest on the amount of incompatible aid since the date it was granted.  
 
                                                 
37
 See C-288/96, Germany v Commission; and the opinion of Advocate-General Jaaskinen in case 
C-106/09 P, European Commission v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, paragraph 161. 
38
 See Commission Decision 2012/541 on state aid granted by Greece to United Textiles; Commission 
Decision 2012/51 on aid implemented by Italy for Legler; Commission Decision 2010/359 on aid 
implemented by Italy for Ixfin. 
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During the past decade or so, some of the most prominent cases involving guarantees referred 
to unlimited coverage of all liabilities of state banks and state-owned entities such as postal 
undertakings. Since in many cases, the guarantees had been granted before the establishment 
of European Economic Community, they were deemed to constitute “existing aid”. This meant 
that the Commission could only request their abolition without recovery. 
 
Recently, however, there has been one interesting case of incompatible aid where recovery 
was ordered. The case concerned the injection of capital and the granting of guarantees to 
Ålands Industrihus (ÅI) which is a 100% state-owned property developer located on the Finnish 
island of Åland. 
 
The Commission calculated the amount of state aid in the public guarantees and the private 
loans that were extended at a lower rate of interest as a result of the guarantees following the 
approach that is laid down in the Commission Communication on Reference and Discount 
Rates and the Commission Notice on Guarantees. 
 
ÅI was not an undertaking in difficulty (in the meaning of the Rescue & Restructuring 
Guidelines) but it barely made any profit. As a result, the Commission concluded that no 
private investor would be willing to inject capital in the company. Although it was not in 
difficulty it could not provide a return to match the sum of the return on the riskless 
alternative (which was the 2-year Finnish government bond) and the additional risk borne by 
investors in ÅI. With respect to the capital injections, the total amount of the injections had to 
be recovered. 
 
With respect to guarantees and loans, there was state aid because the guarantees covered 
100% of the loans. Not only is this contrary to the Guarantee Notice, it also not in conformity 
with the behaviour of a private investor. This is because no private investor would offer a 
100% guarantee because it would provide perverse incentives to the borrower to default. 
In calculating the premium that should have been charged to ÅI, the main difficulty and issue 
of contention between the Commission and the Finnish authorities was the credit rating of ÅI. 
The Commission concluded that although ÅI could offer a normal collateral, its credit rating 
was weak. The problem was that no market premium could be found for that kind of risk. So, 
the market premium could not be compared to the premium actually charged. Therefore, the 
amount of state aid and, consequently, the amount that had to be recovered was the 
difference between the market rate of interest on the loans without the guarantee and the 
cost of the loans at the lower rate plus the guarantee premium that was actually charged.  
 
Two more aspects of this case are worth mentioning. First, the actual premium was made up 
of two components: the annual premium on the outstanding amount of the loans plus an one-
off payment made up front. The Commission considered only the annual premium presumably 
because the one-off payment would be made irrespective of whether the annual premium was 
at market rate or below market rate. 
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Second, the reason for the incompatibility of state aid was that it did not comply with any of 
the guidelines on state aid or the General Block Exemption Regulation. Although the capital 
injections, loans and guarantees aimed to enable ÅI to undertake particular projects, no strict 
limits as to the uses of these funds were imposed on ÅI, no check was performed on the 
necessity of aid, nor was the aid intensity prevented from breaching the thresholds allowed by 
the various guidelines or the GBER. 
 
II.7. Conclusions  
Part II of the paper has analysed the rules concerning the measurement of state aid in public 
loans and guarantees and reviewed the decisional practice of the European Commission. The 
principles are few and simple. The granting of a public loan or guarantee involves state aid as 
long as the corresponding interest rate or premium is below the rate that would be charged by 
the market for the same risk. In the case of guarantees, the amount of aid is the difference 
between the two rates, while in the case of loans, the amount of the aid is the difference 
between the two rates multiplied by the principal. The benefit from subsidised loans or 
guarantees normally goes to the borrower, not the lender. If the borrower is in financial 
difficulty normally the whole amount of the loan is the amount of state aid. 
 
There are, however, important complications. If there is aid in a guarantee, there is also aid in 
the guaranteed loan because the interest rate charged would normally be lower. This is 
despite the fact that the public authority that grants the guarantee does not forgo any 
resources when the loan is provided by a private financial institution. If the guarantee is 
granted after a loan becomes non-performing or the borrower encounters difficulties in 
repaying the loan and the terms of the loan are not adjusted accordingly, then the guarantee 
also involves state aid to the lender. 
The most important complication is the establishment of a credible methodology for 
calculating the amount of state aid or for proving the absence of state aid. The various cases 
reviewed in this paper reveal that public authorities have a choice of different methodologies. 
However, irrespective of which methodology is chosen, the risk probabilities, default rates and 
recovery factors have to be established on the basis of actual experience. This requires 
measurement of market data. Even though these are past data, they can still provide a credible 
foundation for forecasting future default rates and recovery factors. 
 
If state aid is involved in loans or guarantees, public authorities must also ensure that it is 
compatible with the internal market. Apart from the possible procedural requirement of 
notification to the Commission, the problem with this kind of aid is that it has to be linked to a 
project such as, for example, investment, training or research. Otherwise it will be considered 
to be operating aid with all the consequences which are attached to such aid. This is because 
operating aid is allowed only in exceptional circumstances. 
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Annex II.1: Numerical Examples of the Gross Grant Equivalent of State Aid 
 
For all cases below, it is assumed that the borrower is an SME. It borrows EUR 1 million for one 
year. The loan is repaid in full in a single payment including interest at the end of the year. The 
market (or reference) rate of interest is 5%. The credit rating of the borrower is BBB and it can 
offer a normal collateral. 
 
On the basis of these assumptions and according to the Commission Communication on 
Reference and Discount Rates, the margin that should be added for a loan to this undertaking 
is 1%. According to the Commission Notice on Guarantees, the premium that should be 
changed for an individual guarantee is 0.8%. 
 
Example 1: Loan at a preferential rate 
The market rate of interest that should be charged is 6% (= 5% + 1%). 
If the actual interest rate that is charged is, say, 2%, the amount of state aid is EUR 40,000 
(60,000 – 20,000). 
 
Example 2: Free guarantee 
If the premium that is actually charged is 0 and the guarantee covers only 80% of the loan, 
then the amount of state aid included in the guarantee is EUR 6,400 (= (1,000,000 x 0.8 x 
0.008) – 0). 
 
Example 3: Free guarantee that facilitates a loan at a preferential rate 
Since a free public guarantee reduces the risk borne by the lender, the loan may be granted 
without the risk premium of 1%. In this case the amount of state aid is EUR 16,400 (= 6,400 + 
(1,000,000 x 0.01)). 
 
Aid intensity 
If the undertaking is using the loan to make an investment of EUR 1 million, the aid intensity of 
the combined low-interest loan and free guarantee is 1.64% (= 16,400/1,000,000). This aid is in 
principle compatible with the internal market as the aid intensity is below the maximum rates 
permitted by the General Block Exemption Regulation (10% for medium-sized enterprises or 
20% for small enterprises). 
 
 
